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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION
issue in i MM III ' ,i inn n pn-M'iiiul li>

i I M 111 n he pleaded |'iiilh in the

Mm i ,IN ('itv Justice Court. The justice court judge sentenced Mr. Lucero to an actual
and suspended jail sentence. Did Mr Lucero make a constitutionally valid waiver of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel prior to picauing gt.

Preservation. Mr. Lucero preserved this issue in the post-conviction proceedings.
R. 1-2, 26-27, 36-44, 54-57, 116:5-48. He argued that he was sentenced to jail and
suspended jail in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
Argersinger v. Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972), and Alabama v. Shelton. 535 U.S. 654,
122 S.Ct. 1764 (2002), and asked that the remaining suspended jail sentence be vacated.
R.27.
Standard of Review. The issue of whether a criminal defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. State v.
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1998); a copy ofHeaton is in Addendum B. The trial
court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error and the legal conclusion as to
whether the defendant made a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel is
reviewed for correctness. State v. Vancleave. 2001 UT App 228, ^[5, 29 P.3d 680.
TEXT OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Lucero, represented by the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (MLDAM),

2

filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Third District Court on August 1, 2002.
R. 1-2. That petition claimed that Mr. Lucero was sentenced to an actual and suspended
jail sentence in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
named Sheriff Aaron Kennard, Chief Paul Cunningham, the Salt Lake County Jail, and
Murray City Justice Court as respondents. R. 1-2.
A Salt Lake County Deputy District Attorney appeared on behalf of Sheriff
Kennard, Chief Cunningham and the Salt Lake County Jail, and filed an answer on
August 7,2002. R. 5-6. That answer acknowledged receipt of the petition and that at
the time the petition was filed, Appellant was incarcerated. R. 5-6. The answer also
indicated that those three parties were "without knowledge with respect to the allegations
set forth in the petition" and would "immediately and faithfully comply and implement
any order issued by the Court in this matter." R. 6.
The Murray City Attorney's office initially appeared on behalf of Murray City
Justice Court and moved to dismiss the petition. R. 9-14. Mr. Lucero responded to
Murray City Justice Court's motion to dismiss. R. 36-44. Murray City Justice Court
filed a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss on August 21,
2002. R. 71-76. Private counsel entered an appearance for Murray City Justice Court on
September 9, 2002. R. 94. On September 16, 2002, Third District Court Judge Glenn
Iwasaki held a hearing on the petition. R. 98-99. The district court concluded that
Mr. Lucero had waived his right to counsel and dismissed the petition. On October 25,
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2002, findings, conclusions and order were entered. R. 100-102; s.ee_ Addendum A.
Mr. Lucero filed a notice of appeal on November 18, 2002.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. Facts in the Justice Court Docket
Murray City charged Mr. Lucero with driving under the influence of alcohol
("Dill"), a class B misdemeanor, and improper usage of lanes, a class C misdemeanor,
alleging that the crimes occurred on March 17,2001. R. 28; see. Addendum C containing
Murray Municipal Court docket (R. 28-33). The charges were filed in Murray City
Justice Court. R. 28.
Mr. Lucero was arraigned in Murray City Justice Court on June 14, 2001. R. 29.
The minute entry in the docket for that date states, M[a]dvised of rights and penalties."
R. 29. A pretrial conference was scheduled for July 20, 2001. R. 29.
The minute entry in the docket for July 20, 2001 indicates that Mr. Lucero made a
motion to continue the pretrial conference and the motion was granted. R. 30. The
minute entry indicates further, ff[r]eason for continuance: Will look into retaining private
counsel." R. 30. The pretrial conference was continued until October 26, 2001. R. 30.
The entry for October 26,2001 shows that the pretrial conference was again
continued at the defendant's request. R. 30. The reason for the continuance was again
"[Retaining private counsel." R. 30. The pretrial conference was rescheduled for
January 2, 2002. R. 30.
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Although the pretrial conference was continued twice so that Mr. Lucero could
retain counsel, nothing in the docket indicates that the judge considered whether
Mr. Lucero was indigent or conducted a colloquy to determine whether Mr. Lucero
waived counsel prior to the plea hearing. Moreover, the docket shows that after twice
continuing the pretrial conference to retain counsel, Mr. Lucero telephoned the clerk and
said that he would not have a trial and instead would just pay the fine, and would inform
the prosecutor of his decision. R. 31. This notation shows Mr. Lucero's complete lack
of understanding of the process and potential sentence he faced, while also suggesting
that he was unable to retain counsel. See. R. 116:19, 31.
At the January 2, 2002 pretrial conference, the justice court set the matter for a
bench trial on April 29, 2002. R. 31. Mr. Lucero appeared pro se on April 29, 2002 and
pleaded guilty to the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol; the charge of
improper usage of lanes was dismissed. R. 31. The docket entry for the plea hearing
states in its entirety:
The Information is read.
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered.
The Judge orders Intermountain Substance Abuse to prepare a Pre-sentence
report.
TRIAL
Case has been resolved. Deft pled guilty to count I. Upon motion from the
city court orders count II dismissed.
R.31.
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On June 4, 2002, the justice court judge imposed sentence. R. 32. The docket
entry indicates that the judge sentenced Mr. Lucero forthwith to a term of 180 days in jail
and required that Mr. Lucero actually serve those 180 days in jail. R. 32. In addition to
imposing the maximum jail term, the justice court judge also imposed a fine of $1850.00
with a surcharge of $855.41, required that the fine be paid by September 5, 2002, and
placed Mr. Lucero on probation for eighteen months. R. 32-33. After the petition for
post-conviction relief was filed, the Murray City Justice Court judge held a review,
released Mr. Lucero, suspended the remainder of the jail sentence, and placed
Mr. Lucero on probation. R. 116:5. Mr. Lucero had served 98 days of the 180 day jail
sentence when he was released; a suspended jail sentence of 82 days remains in place.
R. 116:5.
The justice court judge made a finding at sentencing that Mr. Lucero was
indigent. R. 33. Following the terms of probation, the minute entry for sentencing
states, "(court finds def. Impecunious)." R. 33.
2. Evidence Submitted During Post-conviction Proceeding
Gwen Kittel, an in-court clerk in the Murray Justice Court, submitted an affidavit
as part of the post-conviction proceedings. R. 77-78. A copy of that affidavit is in
Addendum D. That affidavit indicates that "prior to every arraignment, Judge Ferrero
confirms that each defendant watched the 'Rights of Criminal Defendants' video
narrated by [former] Judge Hutchings." R. 77. A transcript of the Hutchings videotape
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is in Addendum E. According to Ms. Kittel, at the arraignment, Judge Ferrero also
explains a defendant's rights and "orally advises each defendant of their rights, including
their right to be represented by an attorney before he asks the defendant how they wish to
plead." R. 77. The clerk also had the "convincing belief that at the arraignment, "Judge
Ferrero informed Mr. Lucero of his constitutional rights, including his right to be
represented by an attorney and that if he could not afford to hire his own attorney, that
one would be appointed for him free of charge." R. 78.
Counsel for the justice court proffered that the judge, who has taken hundreds of
pleas, could remember Mr. Lucero but could not remember specifically what had
occurred at the plea hearing. R. 116:16. Counsel proffered further that the judge could
testify about his usual procedure:
Counsel for the justice court: He can testify about his usual procedure.
And generally, it's this: He has them sign the waiver and then says
to them, now that you've signed these things and waived your rights, I need
to satisfy my mind that you're doing this freely and voluntarily and you
understand the consequences of it and he goes through those things one by
one. And of course, that is in the file.
He goes through the elements of the offense. He goes through the
possible sentences. He tells them that - - about each of the rights they're
waiving and in this case, in particular, one of those rights as you can see, is
the right to be represented by counsel.
Now, there's some - - in the petition, there is memorandum, she
makes - - she says it's a little unclear as to whether he really has a right or
whether he doesn't. I asked Judge Ferrero about that and he says, well, in
fact, it - - the way it's stated is exactly correct. That is to say, if a - - if - you 're not always afforded an attorney because you can't afford one.
I mean, many of us, if we were charged with a serious crime probably
couldn 7 afford an attorney.
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R. 116:16-17 (emphasis added). According to this proffer, the justice court judge went
through the rights as listed in the form, including the depiction of the right to
court-appointed counsel suggesting that such right does not exist in all cases where the
defendant cannot afford to retain counsel. R. 116:16-17. Counsel further proffered that
the judge would testify regarding his usual practice as follows:
I-I think Judge Ferrero would testify that he goes through that [plea
affidavit] with him, he helps him understand that he does have a right to an
attorney, that if he can't afford one, one will be appointed. That's in
addition to what he's already seen on the - - on the videotape.
And then when he is through asking him all those questions, if he's
satisfied that it's free - - done freely and voluntarily and knowingly and that
he's not under the influence of substances or whatever, then he signs the
thing and that his signature is certification of that.
R. 116:17; see R. 116:16-18 in Addendum F.
A second affidavit signed by Kaylynn Olsen, an in-court clerk, was also submitted
by the justice court in the post-conviction proceedings. R. 85-86; see_ Addendum G. It
claims that "prior to accepting any guilty plea, Judge Ferrero orally advises each
defendant of their rights, including their right to be represented by an attorney." R. 85.
This clerk had a "convincing belief that "prior to accepting Mr. Lucero's guilty plea,
Judge Ferrero orally informed Mr. Lucero of his constitutional rights, including the right
to be represented by an attorney and that if he could not afford to hire his own attorney,
that one would be appointed for him free of charge if he qualified based on his income."
R. 86.
Kaylynn Olsen also indicated in her affidavit that Mr. Lucero had executed "a
8

written rights waiver form informing him of his right to counsel and expressing his desire
to waive that right." R. 86. A copy of a document entitled "Driving Under the Influence
Rights Waiver" ("plea affidavit") which was signed by Mr. Lucero was attached to
Murray City's "Memorandum in Support of... Motion to Dismiss." R. 15-19. A copy
of the plea affidavit is in Addendum H. Regarding the right to counsel, that document
states,
COUNSEL: I have the right to consult with and be represented by an
attorney. If the judge were to determine that I am too poor to be able to
hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one to represent me. I might
later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay for the
appointed lawyer's service to me.
R. 15.
While the judge and clerks could not remember the specifics of Mr. Lucero's case
and instead talked about usual practices, Mr. Lucero did remember the specifics.
Mr. Lucero testified that he had been trying to get an attorney for quite awhile but was
unable to do so because he was not working. R. 116:21. He testified further that he was
totally confused. R. 116:21. On cross-examination, Mr. Lucero testified that he had
"pretty much" watched the Hutchings videotape, that he understood that he had the right
to an attorney at public expense if he could not afford one, and that he told the judge he
could not afford an attorney because he was not working. R. 116:21-22. The judge
asked how much money he made. R. 116:22. Mr. Lucero told the judge how much
money he received as disability payments and the judge said he could not have a lawyer
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because he made too much money. R. 116:22.l
Mr. Lucero's only previous involvement with the law had occurred about thirty
years before this incident, in the 1970fs. R. 116:22. Because so much time had passed,
Mr. Lucero did not remember whether he had been told at the hearings in the 1970fs that
he had the right to court-appointed counsel if he could not afford to retain a lawyer.
R. 116:23. Mr. Lucero could not recall whether he had read the plea form, but testified
that the judge did not go over that form in any kind of detail. R. 116:23-24. Mr. Lucero
could remember the judge asking him some questions, but the specifics of those
questions were not delved into at the post-conviction hearing. R. 116:24.
After Mr. Lucero testified and was subjected to cross-examination, counsel for the
justice court proffered that the justice court judge could not remember whether he asked
Mr. Lucero about his assets, but the judge's usual practice when a defendant asked for an
attorney was to ask about assets and income. R. 116:25-26.
The affidavit of impecuniosity filed along with the petition demonstrates that
Mr. Lucero was indigent. R. 19-22; a copy of the affidavit is in Addendum I. On
July 31, 2002, three months after he pleaded guilty, Mr. Lucero's assets included a 1978
truck and a 1981 motorcycle which had a total value of $3500. R. 19, 22. Mr. Lucero
had debts totaling $3500 and monthly expenses of $800. R. 20. He had no income.
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At sentencing, however, the judge found that Mr. Lucero was impecunious.

R.33.
10

R. 19, 22. He was not employed in July 2002, and his last employment had been in
February 2002, two months prior to pleading guilty without assistance of counsel. R. 21.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies in this case where Mr. Lucero
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to an actual and suspended jail sentence. The
constitutional right to counsel must be "jealously protected" and cannot be waived simply
by expressly stating that one waives his rights. Instead, in order to establish a
constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel, a trial court must (1) advise the
defendant of the danger and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, (2) advise the
defendant that he has a constitutional right to self-representation as well as a right to
counsel and court-appointed counsel if he is indigent, (3) ascertain that the defendant has
the intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of
proceedings without counsel, and (4) ascertain that the defendant understands the nature
and elements of the charges, the possible punishments and any other facts necessary to an
understanding of the case.
None of the requirements for establishing a knowing and voluntary waiver were
met in this case. While Utah case law requires that the record of a colloquy between the
court and defendant be reviewed in order to determine whether the defendant waived
counsel, even if the lack of a record in a non-record court were considered an
extraordinary circumstance, review would be limited to the justice court docket and
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papers filed in the justice court. The justice court docket and papers do not establish that
the requirements for a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel were met in
this case. Moreover, even if the testimony from court personnel presented at the postconviction proceeding is considered, it fails to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver
of the right to counsel.
There is no indication that Mr. Lucero wanted to proceed without counsel.
Instead, the docket shows that the pretrial conference was continued twice while
Mr. Lucero attempted to retain counsel. Mr. Lucero ultimately telephoned the court after
the second continuance of the pretrial conference and indicated that he would just pay the
fine. This indicates that he did not understand the potential penalties or the
consequences he faced since a DUI conviction carries a mandatory jail sentence.
The justice court did not advise Mr. Lucero of the dangers and disadvantages of
proceeding without counsel. It also did not advise Mr. Lucero that he had a
constitutional right to self-representation. Additionally, the advice regarding the right to
counsel did not clearly and correctly inform Mr. Lucero that he had a constitutional right
to counsel and a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel if he were indigent.
Additionally, the justice court made no effort to ascertain that Mr. Lucero
possessed the intelligence and capacity to understand the consequences of proceeding
pro se. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Mr. Lucero did not understand the
consequences since he thought he could just pay a fine for a DUI conviction.
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The justice court also did not ascertain that Mr. Lucero understood the nature and
elements of the charges, the possible penalties and other facts necessary for an
understanding of the case. The plea affidavit was wholly inadequate under Rule 11,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and due process. It failed, among other things, to
inform Mr. Lucero that he had the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, that he had
a limited right to appeal, or that he faced mandatory jail if convicted and also failed to
give a factual basis for the plea. While Mr. Lucero is not asking to vacate his plea, the
inadequacy of the affidavit demonstrates that Mr. Lucero did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive counsel.
The record does not demonstrate that Mr. Lucero knew what he was doing when
he proceeded without counsel or that he understood the risks he was facing. While he
did sign a plea affidavit which outlines a waiver of rights, including the right to counsel,
case law makes it clear that an express statement that one waives counsel is not sufficient
to establish a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel. In this case where
the record demonstrates that a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel
was not made, the district court erred in dismissing the petition; the suspended jail
sentence that remains in place must be vacated.
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ARGUMENT
POINT. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION BECAUSE THE SIXTH AMENDMENT WAS VIOLATED
WHEN THE JUSTICE COURT IMPOSED AN ACTUAL AND
SUSPENDED JAIL SENTENCE IN THE ABSENCE OF A
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL.
A. MR. LUCERO DID NOT MAKE A CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
1. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel in this case.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of
Counsel for the defence." This amendment, applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees an accused the right to counsel and requires
appointment of counsel if the defendant is indigent. Heaton. 958 P.2d at 917 (citing inter
alia Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963)); Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S.
458, 462-63 (1938); State v. Wulffenstein. 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1986)); see also
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301 (1999); Argersinger v. Hamlin . 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
The constitutional right to counsel applies to misdemeanors as well as felonies
whenever actual imprisonment or a suspended jail sentence is imposed. Argersinger. 407
U.S. at 28-37; Alabama v. Shelton. 535 U.S. 654, 654 (2002). In Argersinger. the Court
recognized the importance of the right to counsel in ensuring a fair proceeding, and held
"that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any
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offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented
by counsel at his trial." Argersinger. 407 U.S. at 31, 37. The United States Supreme
Court recently reiterated the importance of the right to counsel, and clarified that such
right attaches any time an actual or suspended jail sentence is imposed. See Shelton, 535
U.S. at 654.
Because the penalty for DUI includes a mandatory jail sentence (see. Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44 (4) (Supp. 2002)), a person such as Mr. Lucero who is charged with DUI
has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In cases where the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel applies, a court cannot sentence a defendant to an actual or suspended jail
sentence unless the defendant makes a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to
counsel. See Argersinger. 407 U.S. at 31; Shelton. 535 U.S. at 654, 658. This is so
regardless of whether the defendant pleads guilty or goes to trial. See Von Moltke v.
Gillies. 332 U.S. 708, 722 (1948). In fact, M[a] waiver of the constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel is of no less moment to an accused who must decide whether to
plead guilty than to an accused who stands trial." IdL There is no question that
Mr. Lucero had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in this case where he was sentenced
to an actual and suspended jail sentence.
2. The right to counsel must be "jealously protected" and is not waived
simply by signing a written waiver that purports to waive that right.
Because of the fundamental and important role played by the right to counsel in a
criminal proceeding, courts are required to "jealously protect[]" that right. Heaton. 958
15

P.2d at 917. The trial judge has the "weighty responsibility .. . of determining whether
there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused." IcL; see also State v.
Bakalov. 849 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Bakalov I"): State v. Bakalov. 862
P.2d 1354, 1355 (Utah 1993) ("Bakalov II"): State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah
1987). There is a presumption against waiver of the right to counsel, "and doubts
concerning waiver must be resolved in the defendant's favor." Heaton. 958 P.2d at 917;
see also State v. Arguelles. 2002 UT 104, f70, 459 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 ("we indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of the right [to counsel]").
"[B]efore the court may permit the defendant to proceed without the assistance of
counsel, the court must conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant to fulfill its duty of
insuring that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917-18. "In making this determination, the court
must advise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation 'so
that the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with
eyes open."'" Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 (further citation omitted); see. also Arguelles.
2002 UT 104, ^|70 (reiterating this requirement); State v. White. 56 N.Y. 2d 110, 118
(N.Y. 1982) (emphasizing that waiver of the right to counsel is not "a routine rubberstampable formality . . . " and that "'a right too easily waived is no right at all'" (further
citation omitted)).
The "preferred method of establishing the validity of a waiver is a colloquy on the
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record between the court and the defendant." Arguelles. 2002 UT 104, f70. "The
reasoning behind this requirement is that the information necessary for the court to make
its determination generally 'can only be elicited after penetrating questioning by the trial
court.'" Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 (citing VonMoltke. 332 U.S. at 724, for the
proposition that,f[a] judge can make certain that an accused's professed waiver of
counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive
examination of all the circumstances'1).
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have repeatedly outlined the minimum
requirements for such a colloquy, requiring that the trial court advise the defendant of the
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, and, in addition, (1) advise the
defendant of his right to counsel as well as his right to self-representation; (2) ascertain
that the defendant has the intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the
consequences of proceeding without counsel; and (3) ascertain that the defendant
understands the nature and elements of the charges, the possible punishments, and any
other facts that are necessary for an understanding of the case. Arguelles. 2002 UT 104,
f70 (citing Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918; State v. Petty. 2001 UT App 396, T|6, 38 P.3d 998,
cert, denied. 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002)); see also Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187 n. 12
(outlining questions a trial court could ask to ascertain whether a defendant knowingly
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waives his right to counsel).2 In addition to advising the defendant of the dangers and
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, the trial court must:
(1) advise the defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel, as well as his constitutional right to represent himself; (2) ascertain
that the defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand and
appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent himself, including
the expectation that the defendant will comply with technical rules and the
recognition that presenting a defense is not just a matter of telling one's
story; and (3) ascertain that the defendant comprehends the nature of the
charges and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any
additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case.
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917; see also Areuelles. 2002 UT 104, f70. The "focus is not solely
on the trial court's express advice," but also on "whether the colloquy clearly establishes
the defendant's level of understanding." Petty, 2001 UT App 396, ^6 (citing State v.
McDonald. 922 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (further citation omitted)); see. also
Vancleave. 2001 UT App 228, ^fl7.
When an on-the-record colloquy does not exist, courts consider the record as a
whole "and make a de novo determination regarding the validity of the defendant's
waiver only in extraordinary circumstances

" Heaton. 958 P.2d at 918. In making

2

In a footnote in Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187 n.12, the Utah Supreme Court
outlined questions that could be asked of a defendant who requests self-representation so
as to establish that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary. Those
questions delve into the defendant's education and background, understanding of the
legal system and rules governing trials and procedure, and the defendant's understanding
of the nature of the charges and penalties. The suggested discussion in Frampton also
includes an admonition advising the defendant against proceeding without counsel and a
suggestion by the judge that even if the defendant proceeds without counsel that standby
counsel be appointed.
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that review, ,l6ff[c]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of the
[right to counsel].'" Id. at 917 (citations omitted).
In Petty, this Court held that Petty had not knowingly waived his right to counsel
and reversed Petty's conviction, remanding for a new trial. Petty« 2001 UT App 396,
<|fl[l1-12. After being informed that Petty wished to represent himself, the trial court
conducted a brief colloquy with Petty. IcL at ^J7. During that colloquy, the court
questioned Petty regarding his education and understanding of the system, and advised
Petty against proceeding without counsel. Id.
[T]he trial court inquired about Petty's education, his general
understanding of the legal system, his knowledge of the Rules of Evidence
and Procedure, and informed him that he had the right to counsel as well as
the right to proceed pro se. The trial court also advised Petty against
proceeding pro se and selected Petty's appointed counsel to act in a standby
capacity.
Id. The trial court did not, however, "address whether Petty '"comprehended the nature
of the charges and proceedings"' or the range of permissible punishments."' Id_ (quoting
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918) (further citation omitted). This Court concluded that "absent a
discussion of the nature of the charges and the range of possible penalties Petty faced, we
cannot say that Petty had a proper understanding of the '"dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation."'" IcL at ^[8 (further citation omitted). Because the trial court "failed
to ensure that Petty was fully informed of the risks involved when he made his choice to
proceed pro se," this Court reversed Petty's conviction and remanded the case for a new
trial. I d a t ^ n .
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A plurality of the United States Supreme Court likewise held in Von Moltke that
the record did not demonstrate that the defendant made a constitutionally adequate
waiver of the right to counsel. Von Moltke. 332 U.S. 708. The Court reached this
conclusion even though Ms. Von Moltke appeared before a judge and "signed a paper
stating that she waived the 'right to be represented by counsel at the trial of this cause/
and then pleaded guilty." IdL at 709.3 In addition, the trial judge questioned
Ms. Von Moltke during the plea hearing and she indicated that she "understood the
indictment and was voluntarily entering a plea of guilty." IdL. at 717. Further,
Ms. Von Moltke was an "intelligent, mentally acute woman." Id. at 720. A lawyer was
temporarily appointed for purposes of the arraignment and Ms. Von Moltke met with two
lawyers on another occasion, but a lawyer was not appointed to represent her following
arraignment. Id at 712, 714, 718. She did meet with FBI agents and government
lawyers and discussed the details of her case and her concerns prior to pleading guilty,
but the plurality recognized that legal advice from government lawyers is not the type of
service contemplated by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id^ at 715, 725.
Although Ms. Van Moltke had expressly stated that she waived counsel, the plurality

3

Von Moltke is a plurality decision with four justices joining in the lead opinion.
Those four justices agreed that the record failed to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the right to counsel and would have reversed the habeas court's decision. Two
additional justices agreed that the district court judgment should be set aside, but
believed the lower court should make further findings on the waiver issue. Von Moltke ,
332 U.S. at 726.
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concluded that the record of the subsequent habeas proceeding nshow[ed] that when
petitioner pleaded guilty, she did not have that full understanding and comprehension of
her legal rights indispensable to a valid waiver of the assistance of counsel.11 Id_ at 720.
The conclusion that Ms. Von Moltke did not make a constitutionally valid waiver
of her right to counsel even though she expressly waived that right was supported by a
number of considerations. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel and
court-appointed counsel if the defendant is unable to hire a lawyer and courts must
carefully protect that right. Id at 720. The right to counsel is as important, if not more
so, when a person pleads guilty as it is when a person goes to trial because, among other
things, a lawyer is critical in determining whether the state can prove all of the elements
of the charge. Id. at 721-22. A trial judge has the duty and "solemn obligation" when "a
defendant appears without counsel to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps
necessary to insure the fullest protection of [the right to counsel]." IdL at 722. "This
duty cannot be discharged as though it were a mere procedural formality." Id. To
discharge this duty, the judge must make a thorough and penetrating examination of all
of the circumstances; "[t]he fact that an accused may tell [the judge] that he is informed
of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right does not automatically end the
judge's responsibility." Id at 724. Because the record failed to demonstrate that
Ms. Von Moltke knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to counsel, a majority of the
court vacated the habeas court's judgment. Id. at 726-27.
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Von Moltke and Petty, along with a number of other cases, make it clear that
simply signing a waiver form or stating on the record that one waives the right to counsel
is not enough to establish a constitutionally valid waiver of the right to counsel. Indeed,
such a purported waiver along with questioning by the trial court was not sufficient to
establish a knowing and voluntary waiver in either of those cases. Instead, as Utah
appellate courts have repeatedly mandated, a trial judge must ensure that the right to
counsel is carefully protected by (1) advising the defendant of the dangers and
disadvantages of proceeding pro se, (2) advising the defendant of the right to counsel as
well as the right to self-representation, (3) ascertaining that the defendant has the
intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of proceeding
without counsel, and (4) ascertaining that the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the charges, the possible punishments including any mandatory punishment,
and any other facts that might be necessary to understanding the case.
3. The post-conviction court incorrectly concluded that Mr. Lucero made a
constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel.
There is no transcript from the justice court from which to conclude that the
justice court conducted a constitutionally adequate colloquy with Mr. Lucero or
otherwise met the requirements for a constitutionally adequate waiver as outlined in
Heaton, Petty and other cases. Even if this Court were to consider the lack of record in a
justice court an extraordinary circumstance that justified consideration of the justice
court docket and filings, those documents fail to establish a constitutionally adequate
22

waiver of the right to counsel. Moreover, even if this Court considers the after-the-fact
evidence submitted at the post-conviction proceeding, that evidence fails to demonstrate
that the requirements for a constitutionally adequate waiver, as set forth in Heaton and
numerous other cases, were met in this case.
(a) Because there is no record of the colloquy between the justice court
judge and Mr. Lucero, the post-conviction court incorrectly concluded that
Mr. Lucero had waived his right to counsel.
Utah case law is clear that the preferred method for establishing a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel is an on-the-record colloquy between the judge
and the defendant. Arguelles, 2002 UT 104 at f70. Because a justice court is not a court
of record, a review of an on-the-record colloquy between the judge and the defendant can
never be made in a justice court case. Arguably, the lack of a record injustice court
cases precludes higher courts from ever concluding that the defendant made a knowing
and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel because in the absence of a record, there is
no way of ascertaining whether the justice court judge conducted penetrating and
in depth questioning and otherwise delved into the matter sufficiently to demonstrate a
knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. Even in cases where a judge has
conducted an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant, higher courts have concluded
that the colloquy was not sufficiently penetrating to demonstrate a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. See. e^g. Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 723-24; Petty,
2001 UT App 396 at ffi[7-9. Given Mthe central importance of the colloquy in
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determining whether a defendant has validly waived his right to counsel" (Petty, 2001
UT App 396 at TJ9), the lack of an on-the record colloquy between the justice court judge
and Mr. Lucero precluded the district court from concluding that Mr. Lucero made a
constitutionally adequate waiver of his right to counsel.
Alternatively, even if this Court were to look beyond the lack of an on-the-record
colloquy, the review should be limited to a consideration of information found in the
justice court docket and filings. While the preferred method for establishing waiver of
the right to counsel is an on-the-record colloquy, Utah case law allows courts to look
beyond the record of the colloquy to determine whether there was a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel only in extraordinary circumstances. Heaton,
958 P.2d at 918. When extraordinary circumstances justify looking beyond the colloquy,
courts look to the record as a whole and make a de novo determination. Id.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the absence of a record injustice court is
an extraordinary circumstance that justifies considering something other than an on-therecord colloquy in determining whether a criminal defendant made a constitutionally
adequate waiver of the right to counsel, it would seem that any review of "the record as a
whole" would go no further than a review of the justice court docket and the papers filed
in the justice court. In other words, in order to follow the mandate of this Court and the
Utah Supreme Court, courts would look no further than the docket and documents filed
in the justice court in determining whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily
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waived the right to counsel. Such an approach is consistent with Heaton . Petty and other
cases that allow, at most, a review of the record as a whole.
Moreover, such an approach prevents the temptation to reach a post-judgment
rationalization or tainting of what actually occurred. See generally State v. Ramirez, 817
P.2d 774, 789 (Utah 1991) (refusing to remand a case for findings and to allow the trial
judge to address an admissibility question where there was conflicting evidence and such
a remand would "tempt [the court] to reach a post hoc rationalization for the admission
of this pivotal evidence" and that lf[s]uch a mode of proceeding holds too much potential
for abuse"). Allowing a judge or court personnel to testify after the fact as to the details
of a colloquy would hold an enormous potential for abuse and fail, due to faulty
memories and lack of detail, to ensure that waivers of counsel are knowingly and
voluntarily made.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-121 (2002) requires justice courts to keep a docket which
includes, among other things, "minutes of the pleadings and motions in writing by
referring to them, and if not in writing, by a concise statement of the material parts of the
pleadings." "Entries in a justice court judge's docket under 78-5-121, certified by the
judge or his successor in office, are prima facie evidence of the facts stated." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-5-122 (2002V, see also State v. Bailev. 282 P.2d 339, 341 (Utah 1955) (justice
court docket is prima facie evidence of facts stated in the docket). Because the justice
court is required to keep entries of what transpires, these provisions further demonstrate
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that even if courts were to look beyond the on-the-record colloquy requirement when
determining whether a constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel was made injustice
court, the consideration should be limited to the justice court docket and filings, rather
than general, after-the-fact testimony.
This Court's decision in State v. Gutierrez. 2003 UT App 95, 470 Utah Adv. Rep.
52 does not require consideration of testimony from court personnel regarding the details
of the proceedings in the context of this case. The issue in Gutierrez was whether a
justice court plea was involuntary; Heaton and other case law that ordinarily requires a
review of the plea colloquy and allows only in extraordinary circumstances a review of
the record as a whole for determining whether counsel was waived was not implicated in
Gutierrez. Instead, this Court was considering in Gutierrez whether a defendant's claim
in an enhanced DUI case that his prior convictions injustice court were involuntary
could be supported solely by the defendant's "self-serving affidavit." Gutierrez. 2003
UT App 95, ^[11. This Court stated that when challenging the voluntariness of plea in
that context, "a defendant seeking to rebut the presumption of regularity must produce a
transcript, testimony regarding taking of the plea, a docket sheet, or other affirmative
evidence.11 Id While Gutierrez allows a defendant challenging the voluntariness of a
plea to submit testimony from court personnel regarding the details of the proceedings in
the context of that case, it does not necessarily follow that the justice court can submit
such testimony in a case where a defendant claims that he did not make a constitutionally
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adequate waiver of counsel. This is so because case law regarding waiver of the right to
counsel requires a review of the plea colloquy or, at most, a review of the record as a
whole in extraordinary circumstances.
In this case where the justice court docket and file fail to demonstrate a
constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel, consideration of testimony by
court personnel is unwarranted. This Court need not reach the issue of whether
testimony from court personnel is appropriate, however, because even if all of the
evidence submitted at the post-conviction hearing is considered, it fails to demonstrate a
knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.
(b) Even if the "record" as a whole is considered, the justice court docket
and plea affidavit fail to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of
the right to counsel; additionally, the materials submitted at the habeas
hearing, when considered along with the docket and plea affidavit, fail to
demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel
Although the justice court is charged with keeping a concise statement of what
occurred (see Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-121), the docket in this case does not contain
findings or conclusions by the justice court that Mr. Lucero knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to counsel. R. 28-33. Nor is there any indication in the docket that the
justice court judge conducted a colloquy with Mr. Lucero regarding waiver of counsel or
otherwise took the necessary steps to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
right to counsel. It appears from the docket that the judge never made a determination
that Mr. Lucero knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and instead
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proceeded with the case without ever conducting the type of penetrating questioning that
is required for a constitutionally valid waiver of the right to counsel.
The absence of a record of the plea colloquy coupled with the failure of the justice
court to make findings and conclusions that Mr. Lucero knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to counsel precludes such a conclusion after the fact. See generally
Petty. 2001 UT App 396 at «|9 (further citation omitted) (pointing out that "'[appellate]
court's proper role is to review the trial court's findings and conclusions and then
determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that the defendant validly waived
counsel'"). Indeed, in a non-record court where a summary of any hearings are included
in the docket, the failure to include a notation that the judge determined that the
defendant waived counsel should preclude a higher court from determining that the judge
made such a determination.4
Moreover, regardless of whether the justice court judge concluded that
Mr. Lucero waived his right to counsel, the docket and plea affidavit do not demonstrate
a constitutionally adequate waiver of that right. As a preliminary matter, in order to
consider the contents of the plea affidavit, that affidavit must be incorporated into the

4

The lack of notation that the judge conducted a colloquy or found that
Mr. Lucero waived counsel is particularly significant in light of the fact that a notation
appears in the docket indicating that at sentencing, the judge found Mr. Lucero to be
impecunious. The sentencing notation regarding Mr. Lucero's impecuniosity
demonstrates that the justice court would include a notation if it conducted a colloquy
regarding waiver of counsel or found that Mr. Lucero had waived counsel.
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plea colloquy as required by Utah case law. See State v. Maguire. 830 P.2d 216, 217-8
(Utah 1991); State v. Visser. 2000 UT 88,1fl5,22 P.3d 1242; State v. Gibbons ,740 P.2d
1309, 1312-14 (Utah 1987). The trial court must personally establish during the
colloquy "that the defendant has read, has understood, and acknowledges all of the
information contained [in the affidavit]." Visser, 2000 UT 88,1fi|l 1-12. An affidavit can
be considered when the trial court questions the defendant during the plea hearing and
ascertains that the defendant read and understood the affidavit, and clarifies any
ambiguities, omissions or uncertainties. State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470,476-77 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
In this case, the docket fails to even mention the plea affidavit, let alone include
notations indicating that the justice court judge personally established that Mr. Lucero
had read and understood the affidavit. Instead, it indicates that f,[t]he Information is
read11 and the "Court advises defendant of rights and penalties." R. 31.
Nor does the proffer of the justice court judge's testimony indicate that the judge
personally established that Mr. Lucero read and understood the plea affidavit. Reading
the information and advising a defendant of his rights and penalties is not sufficient to
incorporate an affidavit. Maguire., 830 P.2d at 217-18. Nor is the signature of the
defendant indicating that he read the affidavit sufficient to incorporate it. IcL Instead, the
affidavit itself must be discussed and its contents clarified in order to incorporate the
affidavit into the plea proceeding. Visser. 2000 UT 88, f p 1-12. While the affidavit
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itself states that the judge or a lawyer has explained the constitutional rights, and the
defendant has read and understands the contents of the affidavit (R. 16-17), these
statements do not indicate that the judge discussed the affidavit with the defendant
during the hearing or otherwise took the steps necessary to ensure that Mr. Lucero had
read, understood, and acknowledged the affidavit. Under Utah case law, the lack of a
record demonstrating that the judge ascertained that Mr. Lucero had read and understood
the affidavit and clarified any ambiguities precludes the incorporation of the plea
affidavit into the plea colloquy.
Even if the affidavit is considered, however, the affidavit and docket fail to
demonstrate a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel. The marshaled
evidence found in the docket and plea affidavit in support of a determination that
Mr. Lucero waived his right to counsel is as follows5:
1. At the arraignment on June 14, 2001, Mr. Lucero was ff[a]dvised of
rights and penalties." R. 29.
2. The pretrial conference was continued twice because Mr. Lucero "will
look into retaining private counsel" and was "retaining private counsel."
R.30.

5

A determination that a criminal defendant made a constitutionally adequate
waiver is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See. Vancleave. 2001 UT
App at ^|5. Any factual findings supporting that determination are reviewed for clear
error. Although this issue involves a question of law, Mr. Lucero marshals the evidence
for the court's convenience.
30

3. The case was set over for a bench trial after the second scheduled
pretrial conference. At the bench trial hearing, the Information was read
and "the Court advise[d] defendant of rights and penalties." R. 31.
4. The plea affidavit, entitled "Driving Under the Influence Rights
Waiver" was signed by Mr. Lucero. It contains a paragraph regarding the
right to counsel that states:
COUNSEL: I have the right to consult with and be
represented by an attorney. If the judge were to determine
that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge
could appoint one to represent me. I might later, if the judge
determined I was able, be required to pay for the appointed
lawyer's service to me.
R. 15.
5. Following this paragraph regarding the right to counsel, five additional
constitutional rights are addressed. On page two of the form, after the last
of these constitutional rights is addressed, the form contains a paragraph
that states:
I understand each of these constitutional rights. They have
been explained to me by the judge or a lawyer. I have no
question about them. I know that I could plead not guilty and
exercise all of the rights listed above. I understand that by
entering a plea of guilty, [sic] I AM GIVING UP THESE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
R. 16. The affidavit is signed on page four. R. 18.
The additional marshaled evidence presented at the habeas hearing is as follows:
1. The arraignment clerk submitted an affidavit that did not include a
specific recollection of Mr. Lucero's case and instead outlined the justice
court judge's usual practice at arraignment. That usual practice included
"orally advis[ing] each defendant of their rights, including the right to be
represented by an attorney before he asks the defendant how they wish to
plead." R. 77. The arraignment clerk had a "convincing belief1 that the
judge "informed Mr. Lucero of his constitutional rights, including his right
to be represented by an attorney and that if he could not afford to hire his
own attorney, that one would be appointed for him free of charge." R. 77.
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2. The arraignment clerk's affidavit also indicated that it was the justice
court judge's usual practice to confirm prior to arraignment that each
defendant watched the "Rights of Criminal Defendants" videotape narrated
by former Judge Hutchings ["Hutchings videotape"].
3. The Hutchings videotape states in regard to the right to counsel:
If you plead guilty or no contest, you will not have a trial and you will be
giving up or waiving certain rights. These rights are:
Also, the right to hire your own lawyer to represent you. If you will be
hiring your own lawyer, please tell the judge today. If you want to have a
lawyer represent you and if you do not have the money to hire one, you can
ask the judge to appoint a public defender. You will need to tell the judge
about your financial situation and the judge will decide if you qualify for a
public defender.
See transcript of Hutchings videotape in Addendum E.
4. Another in-court clerk submitted a similar affidavit. It also contained
information about the judge's usual practice, but nothing specific to this
case. According to the affidavit, the judge's usual practice is "prior to
accepting any guilty plea, [the judge] orally advises each defendant of their
rights, including the right to be represented by an attorney." R. 85-6.
This second clerk also had a "convincing belief that the justice court judge
"informed Mr. Lucero of his constitutional rights, including the right to be
represented by an attorney and that if he could not afford to hire his own
attorney, that one would be appointed for him free of charge if he qualified
based on income." R. 86.
5. The second clerk also indicated that Mr. Lucero had executed a written
waiver of rights form. R. 86. This is the plea affidavit referred to above.
6. Counsel for the justice court proffered the testimony of the justice court
judge. The proffer included information about the judge's usual practice,
but no details specific to Mr. Lucero's case. The judge's usual practice is
to have defendants sign the waiver in the affidavit, then tell defendants,
"now that you've signed these things and waived your rights, I need to
satisfy my mind that you're doing so freely and voluntarily and you
understand the consequences of it and he goes through those things one by
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one." R. 116:16-17. The judge goes through the elements, sentences, and
rights being waived, including the right to counsel. R. 116:16-17. As part
of the proffer, counsel indicated that the justice court judge correctly stated
the constitutional right to counsel does not always include the right to court
appointed counsel when someone cannot afford a lawyer. R. 116:16-17.
7. Counsel for the justice court also proffered that the judge could not
remember whether he asked Mr. Lucero about his assets, but the judge's
usual practice when a defendant asks for an attorney is to ask about assets
and income.
(i) The justice court judge did not inform Mr. Lucero of the dangers and
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel
Neither the docket nor the plea affidavit demonstrate in any way that the justice
court judge informed Mr. Lucero of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se.
See Arguelles, 2002 UT 104 at TJ70. Advising a defendant of rights and penalties is
distinct from advising a defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding
pro se. Since advising a defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding
pro se is necessary for a waiver of the constitutional right to counsel (see. e.g. Heaton,
958 P.2d at 918), the absence of an indication in the docket and plea affidavit that the
judge gave such an admonition precludes the finding of a knowing and voluntary waiver
of the right to counsel. The district court therefore incorrectly concluded that Mr. Lucero
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
Even if this Court looks beyond the justice court docket and filings, the evidence
presented as part of the habeas proceeding likewise fails to demonstrate that the justice
court advised Mr. Lucero of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without
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counsel. The information presented by the justice court was not specific to Mr. Lucero's
case. R. 77-78, 85-86, 116:17-18, 26. Further, it failed to contain any suggestion that
the justice court judge had discussed with Mr. Lucero the dangers and disadvantages of
proceeding pro se. Li Indeed, the judge's proffer and affidavit suggest that the judge
believed a general recitation of rights along with a general waiver was sufficient to
proceed without counsel. R. 116:17-18. This failure to advise the defendant of the
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se precludes a determination that
Mr. Lucero made a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel.
00 The justice court judge did not clearly and correctly advise Mr. Lucero
regarding his right to counsel and did not advise him regarding his right to
self-representation.
The docket and plea affidavit also fail to demonstrate that the justice court judge
clearly and correctly advised Mr. Lucero regarding his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
as well as his right to self-representation. Mr. Lucero therefore did not make a
constitutionally adequate waiver of his right to counsel.
There is no indication in either the docket or affidavit that the justice court judge
advised Mr. Lucero that the right to self-representation is a distinct constitutional right.
Such an admonition is necessary for a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to
counsel. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917. Advising a defendant that s/he has a
constitutional right to self-representation is important in demonstrating a knowing waiver
because it emphasizes that proceeding without counsel is a choice being made by a
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criminal defendant rather than a fallback position when the defendant is unable to retain
counsel.
Additionally, as far as the advice given concerning the right to counsel, the docket
and plea affidavit fail to demonstrate that Mr. Lucero was correctly advised regarding the
nature of this right. The docket states that the justice court judge advised Mr. Lucero of
his rights on two occasions. The docket does not specify what rights were covered or the
nature of what was said regarding each right. Given the fundamental importance of the
right to counsel, it cannot be presumed from this general notation that the justice court
judge correctly advised Mr. Lucero regarding the right to counsel, or even that he
specifically discussed the right to counsel. Judges often list rights, thinking they are
covering all relevant constitutional rights, and nevertheless miss something. See e.g.
State v. TarnawieckL 2000 UT App 186, f*, 5 P.3d 1222.
Moreover, the depiction of the right to counsel in the plea affidavit suggests that
the right is not absolute, and instead, that the judge has discretion as to whether to
appoint counsel. R. 15. Rather than clearly stating that a defendant has the
constitutional right to counsel and if the defendant is indigent, a constitutional right to
appointed counsel, the affidavit never indicates the constitutional magnitude of the right
and instead suggests that the right to counsel is qualified, that the decision as to whether
to appoint counsel is discretionary with the judge, and that even if counsel is appointed,
the defendant might be required to pay for counsel. R. 15. The affidavit states:
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COUNSEL: I have the right to consult with and to be represented by an
attorney. If the judge were to determine that I am too poor to be able to
hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one to represent me. I might
later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay for the
appointed lawyer's service to me.
R. 15 (emphasis added). This passage does not clearly convey that an indigent criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel. Instead, it states that if
the judge decides that someone is unable to afford to retain counsel, the judge could i.e.
may or may not appoint counsel. Because the affidavit and docket do not demonstrate
that Mr. Lucero was clearly and correctly advised regarding the right to counsel as well
as the right to proceed pro se, the district court erroneously concluded that Mr. Lucero
made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel.
The existence of the Hutchings videotape also does not correctly clarify the nature
of the right to counsel or otherwise establish that Mr. Lucero was correctly and
adequately advised regarding the nature of this right. Nothing in the justice court file
indicates that this videotape was shown to Mr. Lucero.6 Additionally, nothing suggests
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According to one of the affidavits filed by the court clerks, the justice court
judge routinely shows the Hutchings videotape to criminal defendants prior to
arraignment. Nothing in this affidavit or the record states that the tape was shown to
Mr. Lucero. Additionally, nothing in the affidavit or elsewhere suggests that the judge
attempted to incorporate the videotape into the plea colloquy or the arraignment hearing
by asking Mr. Lucero whether he watched, understood and acknowledged the
information in the videotape. Since it is necessary to make sure a defendant read and
understood a plea affidavit in order to incorporate that affidavit into a plea hearing (see
Maguire. 830 P.2d at 217-18; Smith, 812 P.2d at 476-77), it follows that at the very least,
a judge must make sure the defendant has watched, understood and acknowledges the
information in the videotape in order to incorporate the videotape. Since a plea affidavit
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that even if Mr. Lucero was shown the videotape at arraignment, that videotape was
incorporated into the plea hearing by the justice judge asking Mr. Lucero whether he
watched, understood and acknowledged the contents of the videotape. See Maguire, 830
P.2d at 217-18 (in order to incorporate the plea affidavit, the judge must ascertain that
defendant read, understands and acknowledges the contents of the plea affidavit). The
contents of the videotape therefore should play no role in determining whether the justice
court adequately informed Mr. Lucero of the nature of his right to counsel.
Mr. Lucero's acknowledgment as part of the post-conviction proceedings that he
"pretty much" watched the videotape does not change this result. Mr. Lucero's testimony
does not establish that Mr. Lucero watched the entire tape or understood the contents.
Without questioning by the judge and information that Mr. Lucero watched and listened
to the entire tape and understood its contents, the videotape should not be considered.
Even if it is considered, however, the videotape fails to clarify the nature of the
right to counsel. Rather than clearly indicating that an indigent defendant has the
absolute right to court-appointed counsel, the videotape suggests that appointment of
counsel is discretionary with the judge. The tape never states that an indigent defendant
has a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel. Instead, it begins by telling

is specific to a defendant's case whereas the videotape is general in nature and shown to
a room full of people, it also follows that a court wishing to rely on the contents of the
videotape as part of a waiver of rights must do something more to incorporate the
videotape than is required for incorporation of a plea affidavit.
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defendants they have the right to hire their own lawyers. It later tells the defendant that if
he does not have money to hire a lawyer, he "can ask the judge to appoint a public
defender" and "the judge will decide if you qualify for a public defender." Tape at 3; see.
Addendum E. In regard to the right to counsel, the tape states:
Also, the right to hire your own lawyer to represent you. If you will
be hiring your own lawyer, please tell the judge today. If you want to have
a lawyer represent you and if you do not have the money to hire one, you
can ask the judge to appoint a public defender. You will need to tell the
judge about your financial situation and the judge will decide if you qualify
for a public defender.
See Addendum E at 3. This passage fails to inform a defendant that he has an absolute
constitutional right to court-appointed counsel if he is indigent, and fails to ensure that
the right to counsel is "jealously protected."
Moreover, the additional testimony presented at the post-conviction hearing
indicates that the judge did not consider the right to appointed counsel absolute even
when a defendant cannot afford to retain counsel. According to the proffer made by
counsel for the justice court, the justice court believed the right to court-appointed
counsel did not apply in all cases where a defendant could not afford to retain counsel.
R. 116:17. The proffer states in part:
Now there's some - - in the petition, there is a memorandum, she
says it's a little unclear as to whether he really has a right or whether he
doesn't. I asked [the justice court judge] about that and he says, well, in
fact, it - - the way it's stated is exactly correct. That is to say, if a - - if - you're not always afforded an attorney because you can't afford one.
I mean, many of us, if we were charged with a serious crime probably
couldn't afford an attorney.
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R. 116:16-17. Contrary to this statement, in any case where a defendant is unable to
retain counsel without jeopardizing his ability to provide basic necessities for himself
and his family, the Sixth Amendment requires that counsel be appointed. See State v.
Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 282-83 (Utah 1994). This proffer further demonstrates that the
justice court failed to clearly and correctly inform Mr. Lucero that he had the right to
appointment of counsel if he were indigent.
Because the trial court failed to adequately advise Mr. Lucero that he had the
constitutional right to self-representation as well as the constitutional right to courtappointed counsel, the district court erred in concluding that Mr. Lucero made a knowing
and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel.
(Hi) There is no evidence that the justice court judge ascertained that
Mr. Lucero possessed the intelligence and capacity to understand and
appreciate the consequences of proceeding pro se.
Additionally, nothing in the docket or plea affidavit demonstrates that the justice
court ascertained that Mr. Lucero possessed the intelligence and capacity to understand
and appreciate the consequences of proceeding pro se. Advising a defendant of rights
and penalties is not enough to establish a constitutionally adequate waiver; instead,
among other things, the trial judge must also engage the defendant in a colloquy that is
sufficiently in-depth that the judge can ascertain that the defendant understands the
consequences of proceeding without a lawyer. The judge must not only advise the
defendant regarding his right to counsel and self-representation as well as the dangers
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and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, but must also determine that the defendant has a
level of understanding that is sufficient to establish a constitutionally adequate waiver of
the right to counsel. See Petty, 2001 UT App 236 at %7.
Nothing in the docket or plea affidavit demonstrates that the justice court
ascertained that Mr. Lucero possessed the intelligence and capacity to understand and
appreciate the consequences of proceeding without counsel. In fact, the docket
demonstrates that Mr. Lucero was confused and did not understand the consequences of
proceeding without a lawyer since he called and told the clerk that he would not have a
trial and instead just pay the fine. R. 31. Since "just paying a fine11 is not a possible
outcome for a DUI conviction, this notation demonstrates Mr. Lucero's lack of
understanding. Moreover, the docket demonstrates that when Mr. Lucero "called to
inform the court that he would like to just pay [the] fine instead of trial" (R. 31), the
justice court did nothing to dispel Mr. Lucero's incorrect understanding of the
consequences. Instead, the docket indicates that "Def. will call the city to inform them of
his decission [sic]" (R. 31), suggesting that the court left Mr. Lucero with the incorrect
perception that he could simply pay a fine if he chose not to take the DUI case to trial.
The information introduced at the habeas proceeding likewise does not
demonstrate that the justice court ascertained that Mr. Lucero possessed the intelligence
and capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of proceeding pro se.
Indeed, nothing in either the docket or the habeas proceedings suggests that the justice
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court judge understood that such an ascertainment was a necessary part of a waiver of
counsel. See R. 28-31; 116:16-17.
Mr. Lucero's only previous involvement with the criminal justice system was in
the 1970fs, approximately thirty years ago. R. 116:22. The length of time since the prior
involvement suggests a lack of familiarity with the criminal justice system and the
consequences he faced. Other than this very distant involvement in the criminal justice
system, there is nothing in the record about Mr. Lucero's educational background or
familiarity with the rules of procedure and evidence or criminal law. This missing
information coupled with the obvious confusion Mr. Lucero had about the consequences
he faced establishes not only that the justice court did not make the necessary
determination as to Mr. Lucero's intelligence and capacity, but also that Mr. Lucero
lacked the capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of proceeding without
counsel. The district court therefore incorrectly concluded that Mr. Lucero made a
constitutionally adequate waiver of his right to counsel.
(iv) The justice court judge did not ascertain that Mr. Lucero understood
the nature and elements of the charges, the possible penalties and other
facts necessary for an understanding of the case.
In order to have a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel, the
record must also demonstrate that the defendant understood the nature and elements of
the charges, the possible punishment, and any other facts necessary for an understanding
of the case. The record does not demonstrate such an understanding or that the justice
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court ascertained that Mr. Lucero had such an understanding.
The docket shows that Mr. Lucero "called to inform the court that he would like to
just pay fine instead of trial. Def. will call the city to inform them of his decission [sic].'1
R. 31. Since "just pay[ing] fine]" is not an option in a DUI case, this entry demonstrates
that Mr. Lucero did not understand the potential penalties he faced; s_ee_ discussion supra
at 40. Nothing in the docket suggests that the justice court made any effort to correct
Mr. Lucero's misunderstanding. In fact, the entry suggests that the court may have
enhanced the misunderstanding by giving the impression that Mr. Lucero could make
such a decision. R. 31.
Additionally, the plea affidavit was not properly incorporated and should not be
considered; see discussion supra at 28-30. Even if the plea affidavit were properly
incorporated, however, it fails to correct Mr. Lucero's misunderstanding. The affidavit
contains a general recitation of the potential penalties for class B and C misdemeanors. It
does not specify, however, the designation for DUI and does specifically state that a plea
of guilty to this charge carries a potential sentence of six months. Moreover, the plea
affidavit does not mention that DUI carries a mandatory jail sentence. Even if
Mr. Lucero had not evidenced confusion about the potential sentence, this affidavit is
defective in conveying the required information about potential sentence because it does
not inform Mr. Lucero that he faced a potential sentence of six months jail and would
serve at least two days of mandatory jail time. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(4) (Supp.
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2002). In the face of Mr. Lucero's obviously incorrect perception about the potential
sentence he faced, this defective recitation of potential sentences for class B and C
misdemeanors fails to demonstrate that Mr. Lucero understood the potential penalty.
The proffer at the habeas proceedings that as a general practice, the judge "goes
through the possible sentences11 likewise fails to demonstrate that the judge ascertained
that Mr. Lucero understood the possible penalties he faced. The judge's usual routine
does not establish that in this case the judge followed that routine. Additionally, there is
no way of knowing whether the judge clarified that DUI is a class B misdemeanor with
mandatory jail or just reiterated the general information in the plea affidavit regarding
potential sentences for class B and C misdemeanors. Also, since the plea affidavit fails
to mention the mandatory jail, it seems likely that the judge would not mention that at the
hearing. Moreover, even if the judge correctly stated that potential penalty, nothing
demonstrates that Mr. Lucero understood the penalty he faced. Given the fact that the
justice court docket establishes that Mr. Lucero did not understand that he faced a jail
sentence, the general proffer submitted at the post-conviction hearing fails to establish
that Mr. Lucero understood the potential penalties he faced.
Additionally, assuming for the purposes of argument that the plea affidavit was
properly incorporated and can be considered, that affidavit was defective under Rule 11,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and due process. While Mr. Lucero is not asking to
withdraw his guilty plea, the defectiveness of the affidavit under Rule 11 and due process
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is nevertheless pertinent because it fails to establish that Mr. Lucero understood the
nature and elements of the charges, the possible punishments and any other facts
necessary to an understanding of the case. Strict compliance with the Rule 11
requirements is mandated so that the record establishes that a defendant understood the
nature and consequences of pleading guilty and acted knowingly and voluntarily when he
entered the guilty plea and waived his constitutional rights. See Gibbons. 740 P.2d at
1312-14. When a defendant waives his right to counsel along with other rights while
pleading guilty and the guilty plea is not in compliance with Rule 11 and due process,
any purported waiver of counsel is likewise not knowing and voluntary since the record
fails to demonstrate that the defendant understood the nature and elements of the charges,
the possible punishments, and any other facts that are necessary for an understanding of
the case.
Aside from not being properly incorporated, the affidavit in this case fails to
comply with Rule 11 and due process in several substantial ways. Rule 11(e)(1)
mandates that a court find not only that the defendant waived the right to counsel, but
also that the defendant "does not desire counsel" in cases where the defendant is not
represented. The docket shows that Mr. Lucero was trying to retain counsel; this
suggests that he wanted counsel, not that he did not desire counsel. Nothing else
suggests that Mr. Lucero did not desire counsel in this case. Moreover, Mr. Lucero
testified at the post-conviction proceeding that he asked for court-appointed counsel and
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the request was denied.
The affidavit also does not inform the defendant that he has the right to trial by an
impartial jury; nor does it state that the defendant has the right to a speedy trial. See
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3); Tarnawiecki. 2000 UT App 186,1(916-18 (plain error occurs
when a trial court fails to inform a defendant that he has the right to a speedy trial where
the plea is taken prior to the start of trial). Additionally, the affidavit does not inform the
defendant that the right to appeal is limited. See. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8). Further,
while the affidavit lists the general punishment for class B and class C misdemeanors, it
does not specify that DUI is a class B misdemeanor. Nor does the affidavit state that a
DUI charge carries a mandatory jail sentence; Rule 11(e)(6) requires such information as
part of the informing defendant of penalty. The affidavit also does not contain a factual
basis for the plea. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313 (a plea
"cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in
relation to the facts . . . " ) .
The wholly inadequate affidavit utilized in this case failed to inform Mr. Lucero
of the nature and elements of the charges, the possible penalties and any other facts
necessary for an understanding of this case. Because the docket and affidavit fail to
demonstrate that Mr. Lucero understood the nature of the charges, how the required
elements related to his actions, the mandatory jail sentence attached to DUIs, the fact that
he had the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, the fact that he had a limited right
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to appeal, and whether he did not desire counsel, the docket and affidavit failed to
demonstrate the third required factor for a knowing and voluntary waiver. The district
court therefore erred in concluding that Mr. Lucero made a constitutionally adequate
waiver of his right to counsel.
(v) The district court erred in concluding that Mr. Lucero knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to counsel
The district court erred in concluding that Mr. Lucero made a constitutionally
adequate waiver of his right to counsel in this case where the requirements set forth in
Heaton and other cases were not met; see discussion supra at 33-45. Nothing in the
justice court record or the record from the post-conviction proceeding suggests that
Mr. Lucero requested self-representation or proceeded without counsel because he
wished to represent himself. Instead, the record shows that he desired counsel since the
pretrial conference was continued twice while Mr. Lucero attempted to retain counsel.
R. 29, 30. Mr. Lucero testified that he had asked the justice court to appoint counsel,
but the court refused. R. 116:22. This case is even clearer than Heaton and Petty in
demonstrating that counsel was not waived because in those cases, the defendant had
asked to proceed without counsel. Moreover, the fact that Mr. Lucero desired counsel
works against a determination that he knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel.
Additionally, while a court is required to take a constitutionally adequate waiver
of the right to counsel regardless of whether a defendant is entitled to court-appointed
counsel, the fact that Mr. Lucero was indigent and entitled to court-appointed counsel
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also weighs against a determination that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel in this case. The justice court record establishes that Mr. Lucero was indigent
when he was sentenced. Indeed, the justice court found him to be impecunious at
sentencing. R. 33. The affidavit filed as part of the post-conviction proceedings likewise
demonstrates that Mr. Lucero was indigent when he entered his plea. R. 19-22. He had
assets totaling $3500 and liabilities in the same amount. In addition, he spent $800 a
month to live. R. 19-22. He had not worked since before the plea hearing. R. 21. The
justice court's factual finding that Mr. Lucero was impecunious along with the affidavit
filed in the post-conviction proceeding demonstrate that Mr. Lucero was unable to retain
counsel due to his poverty. See generally Vincent. 883 P.2d at 283 (a defendant is
entitled to court-appointed counsel if payments to counsel "would place undue hardship
on the defendant's ability to provide the basic necessities of life for the defendant and the
defendant's family").
Mr. Lucero testified that he had asked for court-appointed counsel and such
request had been denied. The record from the post-conviction proceeding demonstrates
that although Mr. Lucero was indigent, he was never provided with the opportunity for
court-appointed counsel. Proceeding without counsel when the right to court-appointed
counsel has been denied is not a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel.
Indeed, the failure to provide Mr. Lucero with court-appointed counsel violated the Sixth
Amendment. See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 658.
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This case does not turn on whether Mr. Lucero is indigent, however. Even if
Mr. Lucero had not been indigent, the Sixth Amendment required that the justice court
judge go through the steps outlined in Heaton and other cases in order to demonstrate a
constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel. While a defendant who refuses
to hire counsel even though he is able to afford to do so may be found to voluntarily
waive the right to counsel based on that refusal, a court nevertheless is required to
adequately advise that defendant regarding the risks and disadvantages of proceeding in
that fashion and otherwise ascertain that the defendant is proceeding without counsel in a
knowing and voluntary fashion.
In this case, the justice court (1) did not inform Mr. Lucero of the dangers and
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, (2) did not clearly and correctly advise
Mr. Lucero regarding the nature of his right to counsel or that he had the right to selfrepresentation, (3) did not ascertain that Mr. Lucero possessed the intelligence and
capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of proceeding pro se, and (4) did
not ascertain that Mr. Lucero understood the nature and elements of the charges, the
possible penalties and other facts necessary for an understanding of the case. Since
failure to demonstrate any of these precludes a determination that a constitutionally
adequate waiver of the right to counsel was made, the failure to do all four leaves no
question that Mr. Lucero did not waive his right to counsel.
Indeed, nothing in this record suggests that Mr. Lucero made a decision to
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proceed without counsel, let alone, that he "'understood] the risks he face[d] in making
that decision[].'n State v. Balderrama, 2003 UT App 139, T|4 (unpublished) (quoting
Petty, 2001 UT App 396 at ^|6). Mr. Lucero did know what he was doing and did not
proceed with his eyes open. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 912. Under these circumstances,
the post-conviction court erred in concluding that Mr. Lucero waived his right to
counsel.
B. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION REQUIRES THAT THE
SUSPENDED JAIL SENTENCE BE VACATED.
The United States Supreme Court held in Shelton "that a suspended sentence that
may 'end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty' may not be imposed unless
the defendant was accorded 'the guiding hand of counsel' in the prosecution of the crime
charged." Shelton, 535 U.S. at 658. Because of the Sixth Amendment violation in
Shelton. the Court affirmed the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court invalidating the
portion of Shelton's sentence that imposed a suspended jail term. Id. at 659, 674. The
Sixth Amendment violation in this case likewise requires that the aspect of Mr. Lucero's
sentence that imposes a suspended jail sentence must be invalidated.
CONCLUSION
Appellant/Petitioner/Defendant Benjamin Frank Lucero respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the decision of the district court and order that the suspended jail
sentence be vacated.
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day of May, 2003.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

HEATHER BRERETON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

jQC T 2 5 2002
_j*LtiAKE COUNTY
Deputy Clo<

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
& ORDER OF THE COURT

BENJAMIN FRANK LUCERO,
Petitioner/Defendant
vs.

Civil Case No. 020907208
SHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD; CHIEF
PAUL CUNNINGHAM; SALT LAKE
COUNTY JAIL; MURRAY CITY
JUSTICE COURT,

Judge: GLENN K. IWASAKI

Respondents/Plaintiff.
On September 16,2002, this matter came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing on
Respondent Murray City Justice Court's Motion to Dismiss the Petitioner's Petition for
Extraordinary Post-Conviction Relief. Present at the evidentiary hearing were Benjamin Lucero,
the Petitioner; Heather Brereton, Attorney for Petitioner; Karl Hendrickson, Attorney for Sheriff
Aaron D. Kennard, Chief Paul Cunningham and the Salt Lake County Jail; Scott Daniels
Attorney for the Murray Municipal Justice Court and P. Gary Ferrero, Murray Justice Court
Judge.
After reviewing the evidence and considering the applicable law, the Court makes the
following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Petitioner appeared pro-se throughout the proceedings in the Murray
Municipal Justice Court.

2.

On two separate occasions, the Petitioner requested his case to be continued so
that he could retain an attorney; both requests were granted by Judge P. Gary
Ferrero.

3.

The Petitioner was not new to the criminal justice system because he had some
previous experience with criminal court proceedings.

4.

The Petitioner viewed the videotape "Rights of Criminal Defendants" narrated by
Judge Hutchings at his arraignment which specifically explains a defendant's right
to counsel and that the court can appoint an attorney if the defendant qualifies.

5.

Although not case specific, the proffered testimony of Judge P. Gary Ferrero and
the affidavits of the Murray Municipal Justice Court clerks indicate that it is Judge
Ferrero's practice to explain to each defendant his or herrightto counsel prior to
accepting a plea.

6.

The Petitioner read and signed a written rights waiver form which specifically
indicated that he had the right to counsel and that the Judge could appoint an
attorney if the defendant was too poor to hire his own attorney.

7.

The written rights waiver form, read and signed by Petitioner, also specified the
maximum penalties (fines and jail time) for the offense with which he had been
charged, (DU1)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

During the proceedings in the Murray Municipal Justice Court, the Petitioner
understood that he had arightto counsel and if he could not afford an attorney,
one could be appointed by the Judge.

2.

The Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be represented by an
attorney when he entered his plea in the Murray Municipal Justice Court.

ORDER OF THE COURT
1.

It is hereby ordered that Murray City Justice Court's Motion to Dismiss the
Petitioner's Request for Extraordinary Post-Conviction Relief is granted and the
Petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary Post-Conviction Relief is thereby
dismissed.

DATED this _Q

^*
day of LsTJ-V

2002.

2

GLENN K. IWASAKI
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE,

V>t'5

1

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Karl Hpfidrickson
Attorrfey for Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard,
Chief Paul Cunningham and the Salt Lake
County Jail

HeatherTJrereton

Attorney for Petitioner

">

C^cJj
i£L2

Scott Daniels
Attorney for the Murray Municipal Justice Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Court was mailed, postage pre-paid to:
Heather Brereton
Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association
Attorneys for Defendant
424 E. 500 S., Suite #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Karl L. Hendrickson
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office
2001 South State Street #S3600
Salt Lake City UT 84190
Scott Daniels
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 521328
Salt Lake City UT 84152
DATED this jCr day of _

.:>

M

_, 2002.
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STATE v. HEATON

Utah 9 H

Cite as 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998)

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
John M. HEATON, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 950238.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 1, 1998.
Defendant was convicted in the District
Court, Ogden Department, Michael J. Glassman, J., of aggravated robbery and evading
arrest. Defendant appealed. The Supreme
Court, Russon, J., held that: (1) burden of
complying with the detainer statute was on
the prosecutor, not the defendant; (2) delay
occasioned by court clerk's error did not
constitute good cause for delay under detainer statute; (3) extending trial date to a reasonable time outside detainer statute's 120day disposition period to accommodate, in
part, defense counsel's schedule constituted
good cause for the delay under the statute;
and (4) defendant did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his constitutional right to
appointed counsel.
Reversed.
1. Criminal Law C=>1134(3)
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss
under detainer statute was reviewed for correctness, where decision was based on legal
conclusion that clerk's administrative mistake
could excuse prosecutor's duty to bring
charges to trial within statutory time limit.
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(1, 3. 4).

dant, and thus, the defendant did not have
the responsibility to find out why his case
had not been sent for trial. U.C.A.1953, 7729-1.
5. Extradition and Detainers G=>59
Even though most of delay in bringing
defendant to trial was occasioned by court
clerk's error, this did not constitute good
cause under detainer statute for delay since
the prosecutor was not relieved o" its burden
of complying with the statute. U.C.A.1953,
77-29-1(1,3,4).
6. Extradition and Detainers <3=>59
When a prisoner delivers written notice
pursuant to detainer statute, prosecutor has
affirmative duty to have defendant's matter
heard within statutory period; implicit in this
duty is duty to notify court that detainer
notice has been filed and to make good faith
effort to comply with statute. U.C.A.1953,
77-29-1(1, 3, 4).
7. Extradition and Detainers C=>59
Since the detainer statute places on the
prosecutor alone the burden of bringing case
to trial within 120-day period, the prosecutor's duty must be independent of the court's
docketing system. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1.
8. Criminal Law e=>1134(6)
Even if lower court erred in its legal
conclusions, Supreme Court may affirm trial
court's decision on any reasonable legal basis, provided that any rationale for affirmance finds support in the record.

3. Criminal Law <3=>1134(3)
Supreme Court reviews trial court's legal determinations for correctness.

9. Extradition and Detainers <s=>59
Deciding whether the district court
properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to detainer statute requires
two-step inquiry: first, Supreme Court must
determine when the 120-day period commenced and when it expired, second, if trial
wras held outside the 120-day period, Supreme Court must then determine whether
good cause excused the delay. U.C.A.1953,
77-29-1.

4. Extradition and Detainers <^59
Burden of complying with the detainerstatute was on the prosecutor, not the defen-

10. Extradition and Detainers <£=»59
Detainer statute's 120-day disposition
period must be extended by amount of time

2. Criminal Law G^735
Whether a waiver of counsel wTas made
knowingly and intelligently is a mixed question of law and fact.
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during which prisoner himself creates delay.
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1.

his choice is made with eyes open. U.S.C.A*
ConstAmend. 6.

11. Extradition and Detainers <3=>59
Extending trial date to a reasonable
time outside detainer statute's 120-day disposition period to accommodate, in part, defense counsel's schedule constituted good
cause for the delay under the statute.
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(3, 4).

16. Criminal Law <S=>641.7(1)

12. Criminal Law ®=>641.4(4), 641.7(1)
Defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional right to appointed counsel, even though court refused to
dismiss defense counsel, recommended that
defendant rely on counsel during voir dire
and strongly advised that he allow counsel to
cross-examine state's witnesses, where trial
court failed to advise defendant, at a minimum, of dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, and had already allowed defendant to proceed pro se when warnings
involving defense counsel were issued.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
13. Criminal Law ^641.4(1)
Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused right to self-representation, provided
only that he knowingly and intelligently forgoes his right to counsel. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 6.
14. Criminal Law <&=>641.4(2)
When a trial court is confronted with
defendant who either refuses to proceed to
trial with appointed counsel or insists on
proceeding pro se, court must carefully consider defendant's right to self-representation
with his right to counsel MS.C.A. Const.
Amend. 6.
15. Criminal Law <^641.7(1)
Before trial court may permit defendant
to proceed without assistance of counsel,
court must conduct thorough inquiry of defendant to fulfill its duty of insuring that
defendant's waiver of counsel is knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made; in making
this determination, the court must advise
defendant of dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation so that the record will
establish that he knows what he is doing and

In addition to advising defendant of dangers and disadvantages of self-representation
before permitting defendant to proceed without assistance of counsel, trial court should
(1) advise defendant of his constitutional
right to assistance of counsel, as well as his
constitutional right to represent himself, (2)
ascertain that defendant possesses intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate consequences of decision to represent
himself, including expectation that defendant
will comply with technical rules and recognition that presenting defense is not just matter of telling one's story, and (3) ascertain
that defettdwrt, ^rapY^hewds, watoe <&
charges and proceedings, range of permissible punishments, and any additional facts
essential to broad understanding of case.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
17. Criminal Law <5=>1139
In the absence of a colloquy on the
record between the court and the defendant
determining the validity of a waiver of counsel, Supreme Court will look at record and
make de novo determination regarding validity of defendant's waiver only in extraordinary circumstances, the existence of which
the Court will address on a case-by-case
basis. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.

Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Kris Leonard,
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
ana appeWee.
Candace S. Bridgess, Kent E. Snider, Ogden, for defendant and appellant.
RUSSON, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
Defendant John M. Heaton appeals a judgment entered on a jury verdict finding him
guilty of aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, and evading arrest, a third degree
felony. We reverse.
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BACKGROUND
Because some of the dates corresponding
to the facts in this case are critical to the
resolution of this appeal, we provide a detailed chronological summary of the relevant
events.
On July 13, 1994, Heaton was arrested for
the robbery of an Albertson's grocery store
in Roy, Utah. The next day, Heaton waived
his right to a preliminary hearing and was
bound over to district court. Heaton was a
parolee at the time, and on July 26, he was
returned to the Utah State Prison for violating his parole. Heaton also qualified for
public assistance and was appointed counsel
from the public defender's office. On August
2, Heaton appeared in district court for arraignment, at which time he pleaded unot
guilty"' to the charges and the judge set a
pretrial conference for August 30 and a jury
trial for September 9. On August 25, while
incarcerated at the prison, Heaton filed a
written request for final disposition of all
matters pending against him pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (the "detainer
statute"), which requires the prosecutor to
bring pending charges against a prisoner to
trial within 120 days from the date the notice
is delivered to certain state officials or their
agents. An authorized agent at the prison
received Heaton's notice on September 3.1
At his pretrial conference on August 30,
Heaton requested a preliminary hearing,
which he had initially waived. The prosecution had no objection, and the parties and the
court agreed to hold a preliminary hearing
on September 9, the date for which the trial
had initially been set. At the September 9
preliminary hearing, the court found that
probable cause existed and set a second arraignment for September 27. At the second
arraignment, Heaton requested that the
judge recuse himself on the basis that the
judge had also presided over Heaton's preliminary hearing. The judge recused himself
and ordered the case reassigned. However,
as a result of an error in the district court
1- The prosecutor's office received the notice on
September 8 The record does not indicate
whether the district court received Heaton's detainer notice; however, the prosecutor stated
that he believed the court probably received the
notice on September 8, 1994

clerk's office, the case was not rea.ssigned.
In late November 1994, after receiving inquiry by a witness regarding the trial date, the
prosecutor contacted the district court for a
status report, whereupon the clerk's office
discovered the error and reassigned the case
to a different judge as previously ordered.
On November 28, the district court sent
the parties a notice of a trial-scheduling conference set for December 7. At that conference, the court initially attempted to set the
trial date for January 19, 1995. However,
because both defense counsel and the prosecutor had a scheduling conflict, the court set
the trial for the next available date suitable
for all the parties, February 16 and 17, 1995.2
Subsequent to the trial-scheduling conference on December 7, 1994, Heaton sent a
letter to the court requesting new counsel.
On February 8, 1995, the court held a hearing to address Heaton's request, which wras
based in part on his defense counsel's refusal
to bring a motion to dismiss pursuant to the
detainer statute. The court denied Heaton's
request. On February 16, 1995, after reevaluating Heaton's claim, Heaton's defense
counsel moved to dismiss pursuant to the
detainer statute. The court, however, found
that at least 60 days of the 71-day delay—
i.e., the period between the second arraignment and the trial-scheduling conference—
were attributable to the administrative error
in the clerk's office. This delay, the court
concluded, constituted "good cause" under
the statute, and the court therefore denied
the motion.
Although originally scheduled for February 16 and 17, 1995, the trial was not actually
held until April 20 and 21, 1995.3 Before
trial, Heaton filed a pro se motion requesting
that the judge recuse himself and requesting
new counsel. A hearing was held on April
19, 1995, and the judge denied both requests.
During the hearing, Heaton indicated that
he did not feel he was receiving adequate
legal representation and that he felt forced to
2. Defense counsel and the prosecutor were working on another criminal trial in rnid-Januan
3. The reasons for the trial delay from February
to April aie not pertinent to this appeal.
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proceed on his own. His attorney indicated
that a "rift" had developed between them,
that he was uncomfortable going to trial because of the "total conflict" between them,
and that he thought Heaton wanted to represent himself. Heaton did not assert his right
to self-representation, and the judge did not
ask Heaton whether he wished to waive his
right to counsel. Instead, the judge (1) advised Heaton of his right to self-representation, (2) refused to permit Heaton's counsel
to withdraw, (3) indicated to Heaton that he
was requiring counsel to remain as standby
counsel to assist Heaton if he wanted the
assistance, and (4) indicated that Heaton was
free to choose to handle trial matters on his
own but that the court would make a record
of Heaton's decision to proceed pro se.
Although Heaton's defense counsel assisted Heaton in selecting the jury, Heaton represented himself at trial. The jury convicted
Heaton on both charges, and he was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of five
years to life and zero to five years at the
Utah State Prison, such terms to be served
consecutively to any sentences Heaton was
already serving.
On appeal, Heaton alleges the following
errors: (1) the trial court erred in denying
his motion to dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute; (2) he was denied his constitutional right to counsel; (3) he was denied his
constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel; and (4) the prosecutor's misconduct
during closing argument constituted reversible error.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1] The trial court's decision to deny
Heaton's motion to dismiss was based on its
legal conclusion that under the detainer statute the clerk's administrative mistake could
excuse the prosecutor's duty to bring Heaton's charges to trial within the 120-day period. Because this is a legal, rather than a
factual, conclusion, we review the trial court's
decision for correctness. See State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991).
[2,3] Whether a waiver of counsel was
made knowingly and intelligently is a mixed
question of law and fact. We review the trial

court's legal determinations for correctness*
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-39
(Utah 1994); Harding v. Lewis, 834 F2d
853, 857 (9th Cir.1987).
ANALYSIS
[4] Heaton first argues that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
pursuant to the detainer statute. That stat*
ute provides, in relevant part:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a
term of imprisonment in the state prison,
jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending
against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the
prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any
appropriate agent of the same, a written
demand specifying the nature of the
charge and the court wherein it is pending
and requesting disposition of the pending
charge, he shall be entitled to have the
charge brought to trial within 120 days of
the date of delivery of written notice.
(3) After written demand is delivered as
required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting
attorney or the defendant or his counsel,
for good cause shown in open court, with
the prisoner or his counsel being present,
may be granted any reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not
brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss
the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that the failure
of the prosecuting attorney to have the
matter heard within the time required is
not supported by good cause, whether a
previous motion for continuance was
made or not, the court shall order the
matter dismissed with prejudice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1), (3), & (4) (emphasis added).
In denying Heaton's motion to dismiss, the
district court made the following ruling:
[T]his Court is going to deny the Defendant's [motion onl the basis that I believe
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that there has been good cause[.] And
that term doesn't quite fit in this situation,
but explainable cause shown as to why the
delay occurred. And the Court does not
find in any way that it was as a result of
the prosecution's dragging its feet.
The facts are that the bulk of the delay,
60 days at least of it, was the fault probably of the Clerk's office in this case. And
again I don't know whether that fits into
what could be called a good cause shown,
but the Court believes that it happens
from time to time, that there can be that
kind of a glitch.
And certainly the Defendant could have
pushed to find out why his case had not
been set for trial. [He] [c]ould have
pushed his counsel to make that request,
[a]nd was in the same position [as was] the
State....
The case sat. And it is unfortunate it
did, but the Court will deny the motion at
this time.
The district court's ruling contradicts section 77-29-1 and our prior case law. The
statute requires the prosecutor "to have the
matter heard within the time required."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4). Moreover,
this court has consistently held that the language of the detainer statute clearly places
the burden of complying with the statute on
the prosecutor. See Petersen, 810 P.2d at
424; State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453
P.2d 158, 160 (1969). In Petersen, the trial
court asked the defendant whether the trial
date was acceptable, and the defendant did
not object to the date, which was outside the
120-day period. Nevertheless, this court
concluded that the defendant was not required to object to the trial date in order to
maintain his rights under the statute because
the burden of bringing the case to trial within the disposition period rested solely with
the prosecution. 810 P.2d at 424. Thus, in
the case at bar, the court clearly erred in
concluding that Heaton was in the same position as was the State and therefore shared
some of the responsibility to find out why his
case had not been set for trial.
[5] The trial court further erred in its
legal conclusion that the 71-day delay, most

of which was occasioned by the court clerk's
error, constituted "good cause" and thereby
relieved the prosecutor of its burden under
the statute. We first note that the judge's
finding that the State did not contribute to
the delay carries little significance. The
mere fact that the delay was not caused by
the prosecutor has never been considered
dispositive because "to hold that good cause
is supported by the lone fact that the delay
was not caused by the prosecutor would contradict the language in section 77-29-1(4)
which places the burden of complying with
the statute on the prosecution." Id. at 426;
see also Wilson, 453 P.2d at 159-60 (reversing trial court's decision not to dismiss, notwithstanding fact that prosecution did not
cause delay).
[6, 7] The State argues that while it could
have followed up on the case earlier, "defendant cites no precedent for attributing to the
prosecutor the responsibility for anticipating
or preventing unexpected and infrequent administrative mistakes made by court personnel." We agree with the State that it is not
responsible for the administrative mistakes
of the court. Nevertheless, it is responsible
for complying with section 77-29-1. Because
the statute places on the prosecutor alone
the burden of bringing the case to trial within the 120-day period, the prosecutor's duty
must be independent of the court's docketing
system. While Heaton's case fell victim to
an administrative "glitch" at the clerk's office, his case also fell through a crack in the
prosecutor's office. Even though the prosecutor's office received Heaton's detainer notice on September 8, 1994, neither the briefs
nor our review of the record indicates that
the prosecutor even addressed Heaton's detainer notice to the court until February 16,
1995, after the disposition period had already
expired. When a prisoner delivers a written
notice pursuant to the detainer statute, the
prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have
the defendant's matter heard within the statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the
duty to notify the court that a detainer notice
has been filed and to make a good faith effort
to comply with the statute. This is not to
say that the prosecutor must succeed, for
"good cause" may support the prosecutor's
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failure to comply. However, where the prosecutor's failure is inaction—in this case, doing nothing whatsoever to bring Heaton's
case to trial within the statutory period—the
trial court may not conclude that the prosecutor's failure is supported by "good cause."
[8,9] Nevertheless, even if the lower
court erred in its legal conclusions, this court
may affirm a trial court's decision on any
reasonable legal basis, provided that any rationale for affirmance finds support in the
record. See K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888
P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994); Hill v. Seattle
First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah
1992). Deciding whether the district court
properly denied Heaton's motion to dismiss
pursuant to the detainer statute requires a
two-step inquiry. First, we must determine
when the 120-day period commenced and
when it expired. Second, if the trial was
held outside the 120-day period, we must
then determine whether "good cause" excused the delay.
[10] The detainer statute clearly provides
that the 120-day period commences on the
date the written notice is delivered "to the
warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1); see also State
v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985)
(holding that 120-day disposition period commences from date of delivery of written notice to warden, not from date defense counsel
files notice of appearance). However, this
court has held that when a prisoner himself
acts to delay the trial, he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive his right to a
speedy trial. Thus, the disposition period
must be extended by the amount of time
during which the prisoner himself creates the
delay. See State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115,
116 (Utah 1982) (concluding that where defendant's trial date was originally scheduled
less than one month after defendant's request for disposition and court granted defendant's request for continuance defendant
was responsible for number of days during
which continuance was granted and could not
include those days in disposition period).
In the case at bar, the 120-day disposition
period commenced on September 3, 1994,
because that is the date on which an autho-

rized agent at the prison received Heaton'*
written notice. However, Heaton did cause a
trial delay. As set forth above, the court
initially scheduled trial for September 9
1994. At his pretrial conference on August
30, Heaton requested a preliminary hearing,
which he had initially waived. The prosecutor having no objection, the court granted
Heaton's request, changing the trial date to
the preliminary hearing date. But for Heaton's request for a preliminary hearing, his
case would have been brought to trial on
September 9, just 6 days after his written
notice had been delivered. Thus, Heaton
delayed his own trial and indicated his willingness to temporarily waive his rights under
the detainer statute. See Velasquez, 641
P.2d at 116.
When the court changed Heaton's trial
date to the preliminary hearing date, in effect it continued Heaton's trial pending the
outcome of the preliminary hearing. Had
the court not found probable cause at the
hearing, it would have had to dismiss the
charges. See Utah R.Crim.P. 7(h)(3). However, the court did find probable cause and
therefore scheduled a second arraignment
for September 27. The court could not set a
new trial date until Heaton entered his pleas
at the second arraignment. Thus, because
Heaton's trial date was continued for the
purpose of accommodating his request for a
preliminary hearing, and because a new trial
date could not even have been considered
until the second arraignment, Heaton may
not include the 18 days between September 9
and September 27 as part of the 120-day
disposition period.
Excluding the 18-day delay attributable to
Heaton, the State had until January 19, 1995,
to bring Heaton to trial. Although the court
initially attempted to set the trial for January 19, 1995, it scheduled the trial beyond
the disposition period because of the defense
counsel's and prosecutor's scheduling conflict. Therefore, we must proceed to step
two of our inquiry to determine whether
continuing the trial to accommodate, in part,
defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good
cause" under section 77-29-1.
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[11J A nearly identical issue was raised in
State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147
(1970), wTherein the initially scheduled trial
date fell within the disposition period, but
because defense counsel had a scheduling
conflict the court rescheduled the trial for
five days beyond the disposition period.
This court concluded that section 77-65-1,
the predecessor to section 77-29-1,4 permitted the court to grant " *for a good cause
shown in open court ... any necessary or
reasonable continuance.'" Bonny, 411 P.2d
at 147-48 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-651). Thus, because the trial was rescheduled
at defense counsel's request and to accommodate his schedule, this court held that the
trial court had authority to grant such a
continuance, which was "entirely reasonable
and practical under the circumstances." Id.
at 148.
Because section 77-29-1(3) contains substantially the same language as section 7765-1 and gives the court discretion to grant
continuances, the reasoning in Bonny is applicable to the case at bar. The January 19,
1995, date initially offered by the trial court
fell within the 120-day disposition period,
and the court was therefore within its authority to grant a reasonable continuance
under section 77-29-1(3) to accommodate defense counsel's schedule. In light of the
other criminal trial both defense counsel and
the prosecutor were engaged in, setting Heaton's trial one month beyond the disposition
period was not unreasonable. Therefore, we
hold that while the district court erred in its
legal conclusions, extending the trial date to
a reasonable time outside the disposition period to accommodate, in part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good cause" under
section 77-29-1(3) and (4), and the trial court
correctly denied Heaton's motion to dismiss.
[12,131 We next address Heaton's argument that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional right to appointed counsel. The Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution guarantees an
accused the right to the assistance of counsel.
See Gideon v. Wainurright, 372 U.S. 335,
342-44, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58
4.

Section

7 7 - 2 9 - 1 , enacted in

1980, replaced

S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). If an accused is indigent, he is entitled to courtappointed counsel. See State v. Wuljfenstein, 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1986). However, the Sixth Amendment also guarantees
an accused the right to self-representation,
"provided only that he [or she] knowingly
and intelligently forgoes his [or her] right to
counsel." McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.
168, 173, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122
(1984); see also Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 807, 818, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d
562(1975).
The right to have the assistance of counsel
in a criminal trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be jealously protected by the trial court. The United States
Supreme Court has stated:
The constitutional right of an accused to be
represented by counsel invokes, of itself,
the protection of a trial court, in which the
accused—whose life or liberty is at stake—
is without counsel. This protecting duty
imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the tncd judge of determining
whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (emphasis added). Because of the importance of
the right to counsel and the heavy burden
placed upon the trial court to protect this
right, there is a presumption against waiver,
and doubts concerning waiver must be resolved in the defendant's favor. See, e.g.,
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019
("'[Cjourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights." (quoting Aetna Ins. Co.
v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809,
81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937))); United States v. Williamson, 806 F.2d 216, 220 (10th Cir.1986)
(doubts concerning waiver of counsel must be
resolved in defendant's favor).
[14-16] When a trial court is confronted
with a defendant who either refuses to proceed to trial with appointed counsel or insists
on proceeding pro se, the court must carefully consider the defendant's right to self-representation with his right to counsel. Nevertheless, before the court may permit the
section 77-to5-1.
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defendant to proceed without the assistance
of counsel, the court must conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant to fulfill its
duty of insuring that the defendant's waiver
of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made. In making this determination, the court must advise the defendant of
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation "so that the record will establish
that 'he knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta,
422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct 2525 (quoting
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317
U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268
(1942)); see Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708, 723-24, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309
(1948); State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183,
187-88 (Utah 1987). In addition, the trial
court should (1) advise the defendant of his
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, as well as his constitutional right to
represent himself; (2) ascertain that the defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent himself,
including the expectation that the defendant
will comply with technical rules and the recognition that presenting a defense is not just
a matter of telling one's story; and (3) ascertain that the defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the
range of permissible punishments, and any
additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case. See State v. Frye, 224
Conn. 253, 617 A.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1992); see
also Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88.5

accused's professed waiver of counsel is*l||
derstandingly and wisely made only frnwM
penetrating and comprehensive examiniSi
of all the circumstances."). In Framptor^M
also stated that in the absence of suchS
colloquy, we will look at any evidence irigyj
record to determine whether the particidil
facts and circumstances support a valid wft|||
er. 737 P.2d at 188.
[17] However, in light of the foregdBK
discussion, this court is reluctant to assiiSJj
the important responsibility which has b&j£
placed upon the trial court. After all, 4^1*
trial court—having the benefit of question™
the defendant and observing his demeanor-Si
is in the best position to determine whethle^
the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and to*
telligently waived his right to counsel IS
contrast, this court's proper role is to revie^
the trial court's findings and conclusions and
then determine whether the trial court corf
rectly concluded that the defendant validljr
waived counsel. A meaningful review of the
trial court can take place only after that
court has conducted a meaningful inquiry of
the defendant. Therefore, in the absence of
such a colloquy, this court will look at the
record and make a de novo determination
regarding the validity of the defendants
waiver only in extraordinary circumstances,
the existence of which we will address on *
case-by-case basis. See Harding, 834 F.2d
at 857.

This court stated in Frampton that a colloquy on the record between the court and the
defendant is the preferred method of determining the validity of a waiver of counsel.
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187. The reasoning
behind this conclusion is that the information
necessary for the court to make its determination generally "can only be elicited after
penetrating questioning by the trial court."
Id.; see also Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724, 68
S.Ct. 316 ("A judge can make certain that an

In the case at bar, the trial court clearly
did not advise Heaton of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation. The
day before trial, during the hearing addressing Heaton's motion for new counsel, the trial
judge stated:
Now, with respect to counsel, you do
have the right to represent yourself. I am
not going to allow Mr. Caine's withdrawal
at this point. Mr. Caine is a capable defense attorney. He is very familiar with
the facts in your case. I am going to
require that he remain on as counsel to
assist you if you want the assistance.

5. In Frampton, as a guide for trial courts, this
court quoted a sixteen-point colloquy recommended to the federal courts lor use when confronting a prospective pro se defendant Frampton, 737 P 2d at 187-88 n 12 (citing Bench Book
for United States District Court Judges, vol 1,

§§ l 02-2 to -5 (Federal Judicial Center, 3d ed.
1986)) Once again, we stronglv recommend
that trial courts use that approach, as it is an
effective means by which to determine whether
the defendant has validly waived his right to
counsel
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Mr. Heaton, if during the process of the
Jury selection, and the defense that you
want to present during the trial, you want
to handle that on your own, you are free to
do that. And you will be making that
decision as you go. We will make a record
of your decision to handle those matters on
vour own if that's your choice.
My recommendation to you is that you
rely on Mr. Caine's expertise and experience and have him help you. But you can
make that choice.
The court's cursory recommendation to
Heaton to rely on defense counsel did not
apprise Heaton in any way of the constitutional significance of the right to counsel and
the consequences of waiver. The State argues that Heaton should have been aware of
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation because on the day of trial, after
the jury had been selected, the court strongly advised Heaton to allow defense counsel to
cross-examine the State's witnesses inasmuch
as Heaton would certainly not be as effective
as defense counsel. While the court's advice
was certainly appropriate, it addressed only
one of the disadvantages of self-representation—i.e., not having experience and expertise in cross-examining witnesses. Moreover, the trial court had already determined
that Heaton had decided to represent himself. As we have previously mentioned, before a trial court may permit a defendant to
proceed pro se, the court must determine
whether the defendant competently waived
counsel at the time of waiver, not after.

We reverse Heaton's convictions and order
a new trial.
HOWE, C.J., DURHAM, .Associate C.J.,
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur in Justice RUSSON's opinion.

KErNUMBtP^STEM/

Lorin FACER, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
R. Lee ALLEN, Allen L. Jensen, James
J. White, and Box Elder County,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 960463.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 12, 199b.

Former justice court judge brought action alleging county commission's pre-election elimination of his precinct violated statutory prohibition against abolishing precincts
within 90 days of an election. The First District Court, Box Elder County, Ben H. Hadfield, J., granted summary judgment in favor
of county, and former judge appealed. The
Supreme Court, Howe, C.J., held that: (lj
statutory prohibition against pre-election
changes applied to precinct in which justice
court judge served, and (2) county commission violated statutory prohibition against
pre-election changes when it combined two
precincts 62 days prior to election, even
though combination was not to take effect
until over two months after election.

We therefore hold that because the trial
court failed to advise Heaton, at a minimum,
of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, Heaton did not validly waive
his constitutional right to counsel. The trial
court erred in permitting Heaton to proceed
pro se, and Heaton is entitled to a new trial.
Reversed.
There are no extraordinary circumstances in
this case which would justify our examination
of the record and making a de novo determination as to whether Heaton knowingly and 1. Appeal and Error C=>842(1)
intelligently waived his right to counsel.
Interpretation of statutes poses a quesMoreover, because the waiver of counsel is- tion of law, which Supreme Court reviews for
sue is dispositive of this appeal, we need not correctness and without deference to the lowaddress Heaton's other arguments.
er court's conclusions.
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MURRAY MUNICIPAL JUSTICE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MURRAY CITY vs. BENJAMIN F LUCERO
CASE NUMBER 015003617 Misdemeanor DUI
CHARGES
Charge 1 - 41-6-44 - DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS
Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: June 14, 2001 Not Guilty
Disposition: April 29, 2002 Guilty Plea
Charge 2 - 41-6-61 - IMPROPER USAGE OF LANES
Class C Misdemeanor
Plea: June 14, 2 001 Not Guilty
Disposition: April 29, 2002 Dismissed
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
GARY FERRERO
PARTIES
Defendant - BENJAMIN F LUCERO
4769 S 4620 W
KEARNS, UT 84118
Plaintiff - MURRAY CITY
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: BENJAMIN F LUCERO
Date of Birth: May 15, 1947
Social Security Number: 528606706
Driver License Number: 6842620
Driver License State: UT
Law Enforcement Agency: UHP - SALT LAKE
Prosecuting Agency: MURRAY CITY
Citation Number: 351464
Violation Date: March 17, 2001 5300 S 600 W
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due
Amount PaidCredit
Balance

1,850.00
0.00
0.00
1,850.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: FIDOE
Amount Due
Amount Paid
Amount Credit

Printed: 06/26/02 10:35:03

1,850.00
0.00
0.00
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CASE NUMBER 015003617 Misdemeanor DUI
Balance:

1,850.00

PROCEEDINGS
03-26-01 Filed: ORR Agreement
.
04-05-01 ARRAIGNMENT scheduled on June 14, 2001 at 08:30 AM in Murray
Justice Court with Judge FERRERO.
04-05-01 Notice - NOTICE for Case 015003617 ID 51436
ARRAIGNMENT is scheduled.
Date: 06/14/2001
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Murray Justice Court
688 East Vine Street
Telephone: 284-4280
Murray, UT 84107
Failure to appear may result in a warrant being issued for your
arrest
04-05-01 Filed: Citation
04-05-01 Judge FERRERO assigned.
06-14-01 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on July 20, 2001 at 09:30 AM in
Murray Justice Court with Judge FERRERO.
06-14-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for Arraignment
Judge:
GARY FERRERO
PRESENT
Clerk:
gkittel
Defendant
Defendant pro se

kgallegc
abeardei
abearde]

abearde
abearde
gkittel
gkittel

ARRAIGNMENT
Advised of rights and penalties.
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 07/20/2001
Time: 09:30 a.m.
Location: Murray Justice Court
688 East Vine Street
Telephone: 284-4280
Murray, UT 84107
07-20-01 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on October 26, 2001 at 09:30 AM
in Murray Justice Court with Judge FERRERO.
07-20-01 Minute Entry - Pretrial Conference continued
Judge:
GARY FERRERO
PRESENT
Clerk:
kolsen
Prosecutor: BROWER, BRIAN
Defendant
Defendant pro se

Printed: 06/26/02 10:35:05
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kolsen
kolsen

CASE NUMBER 015003617 Misdemeanor DUI

CONTINUANCE
The Defendant has made a motion for continuance of Pretrial
Conference.
The motion is granted.
Reason for continuance:
Will look into retaining private counsel
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 10/26/2001
Time: 09:30 a.m.
Location: Murray Justice Court
688 East Vine Street
Telephone: 284-4280
Murray, UT 84107
07-20-01 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE Continued.
10-26-01 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on January 02, 2002 at 01:30 PM
in Murray Justice Court with Judge FERRERO.
10-26-01 Minute Entry - Pretrial Conference continued
Judge:
GARY FERRERO
PRESENT
Clerk:
kolsen
Prosecutor: BROWER, BRIAN
Defendant
Defendant pro se

kolsen
kolsen
kolsen

CONTINUANCE
The Defendant has made a motion for continuance of Pretrial
Conference.
The motion is granted.
Reason for continuance:
Retaining private counsel
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 01/02/2002
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Murray Justice Court
688 East Vine Street
Telephone: 284-4280
Murray, UT 84107
10-26-01 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE Continued.
01-02-02 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on April 29, 2002 at 01:30 PM in Murray
Justice Court with Judge FERRERO.
01-02-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRETRIAL
Judge:
GARY FERRERO
PRESENT
Clerk:
kolsen

Printed: 06/26/02 10:35:06
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kolsen
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CASE NUMBER 015003617 Misdemeanor DUI
Prosecutor: BROWER, BRIAN
Defendant
Defendant pro se
HEARING
Case set over for a Bench Trial.
BENCH TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 04/29/2002
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Murray Justice Court
688 East Vine Street
Telephone: 284-4280
Murray, UT 84107
02-14-02 Filed: letter from Patty Collett
ccamp
02-15-02 Note: cc/gf: In respone to the letter filed 2/14, Court advises
Patty Collett to file a report regarding concerns w/ the
defendant to the appropriate Law Enforcement Agency.
ccamp
04-24-02 Note: BENJAMIN F LUCERO called to inform the court that he
would like to just pay fine instead of trial. Def. will call
the city to inform them of his decission.
cherylc
04-29-02 SENTENCING scheduled on June 04, 2002 at 10:30 AM in Murray
Justice Court with Judge FERRERO.
kolsen
04-29-02 Filed: DUI rights waiver/enhancment
kolsen
04-29-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Bench Trial
kolsen
Judge:
GARY FERRERO
PRESENT
Clerk:
kolsen
Prosecutor: CRITCHFIELD, GL
Defendant
Defendant pro se
The Information is read.
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered.
The Judge orders Intermountain Substance Abuse to prepare a
Pre-sentence report.
TRIAL
Case has been resolved. Deft pled guilty to count I.
from the city court orders count II dismissed.
SENTENCING is scheduled.
Date: 06/04/2002
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Location: Murray Justice Court
688 East Vine Street
Telephone: 284-4280
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Upon motion

CASE NUMBER 015003617 Misdemeanor DUI
Murray, UT 84107
Filed: ISA Presentence Report
gkittel
Filed: ISA/PSR
cherylc
Filed: ISA Presentence Report
gkittel
REVIEW HEARING scheduled on September 05, 2002 at 01:30 PM in
Murray Justice Court with Judge FERRERO.
gkittel
06-04-02 Tracking started for Probation. Review date Dec 04, 2003.
gkittel
06-04-02 Tracking started for Fine. Review date Sep 05, 2002.
gkittel
06-04-02 Filed order: FORTHWITH (180 DAYS)
gkittel
Judge gferrero
Signed June 04, 2002
06-04-02 Fine Account created
Total Due:
1850.00
gkittel
06-04-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME
gkittel
Judge:
GARY FERRERO
PRESENT
Clerk:
gkittel
Defendant
Defendant pro se

05-23-02
06-03-02
06-04-02
06-04-02

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a
term of 180 day(s)
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$1850.00
$0.00
$855.41
$1850.00

Total Fine: $1850.00
Total Suspended: $0
Total Surcharge: $855.41
Total Amount Due: $1850.00
The fine is to be paid in full by 09/05/2002.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s) .
Probation is to be supervised by Murray Municipal Justice Court.
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1850.00 which includes the surcharge.
Pay fine on or before September 5, 2002.
Pay fine to The Court.
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CASE NUMBER 015003617 Misdemeanor DUI

PROBATION CONDITIONS
NO FURTHER VIOLATIONS
NO CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL
RETURN TO COURT FOR REVIEW(S)
NO USE OF NON-PRESCRIBED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IOP PROGRAM THROUGH ISA AFTER RELEASE FROM JAIL
IGNITION INTERLOCK INSTALLED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RELEASE FROM JAIL
(COURT FINDS DEF. IMPECUNIOUS)
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 09/05/2002
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Murray Justice Court
688 East Vine Street
Telephone: 284-4280
Murray, UT 84107
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" EXHIBIT ONE"

BRIAN E. BROWER, UBN 8486
MURRAY CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
5025 S. STATE ST.
P.O. BOX 57520
MURRAY, UTAH 84157-0520
TELEPHONE: (801) 264-2642

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
BENJAMIN FRANK LUCERO,
Petitioner/Defendant
vs.
SHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD; CHIEF
PAUL CUNNINGHAM; SALT LAKE
COUNTY JAIL; MURRAY CITY
JUSTICE COURT,

AFFIDAVIT OF MS. GWEN KITTEL
SUPPORTING MURRAY CITY'S
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITIONER'S
REQUEST FOR EXTRAORDINARY
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Civil Case No. 020907208
Judge: GLENN K. IWASAKI

Respondents/Plaintiff.

At all times herein mentioned, the affiant, Ms. Gwen Kittel, avers the following:
1.

I am one of the two in-court clerks assigned to handle arraignment calendars in the

Murray City Municipal Justice Court for Judge P. Gary Ferrero.
2.

That prior to every arraignment, Judge Ferrero confirms that each defendant has

watched the "Rights of Criminal Defendants" video narrated by Judge Hutchings.
3.

That after confirming each defendant has seen the video explaining a defendant's

rights at the arraignment hearing, Judge Ferrero orally advises each defendant of their
rights, including their right to be represented by an attorney before he asks the defendant
how they wish to plead.
4.

That I was the in-court clerk for Mr. Benjamin Lucero's arraignment hearing on case

number 015003617 in the Murray Municipal Justice Court which took place on June 14,
2001.
5.

That based on my review of the minute entries made by myself during Mr. Lucero's
arraignment hearing as well as my experience observing thousands of arraignments
performed by Judge Ferrero, it is my convincing belief that Judge Ferrero informed Mr.
Lucero of his constitutional rights, including hisrightto be represented by an attorney and
that if he could not afford to hire his own attorney, that one could be appointed for him
free of charge.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thiss2lday of U^^%K^Jz^

.

^~OQ^

Ms. Gwen Kittel, Affiant
Murray City Justice Court Clerk

STATE OF UTAH
:ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the P\^\ day oin^X^\
, 2002, Ms. Gwen Kittel appeared before me, signer of
the foregoing document, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same.

TabE

TRANSCRIPT OF JUDGE HUTCHINGS VIDEOTAPE
My name is Mike Hutchings. I am a judge in Salt Lake County.
I have been asked to tell you about your rights.
If you are charged with a misdemeanor or an infraction, it is
important that you listen carefully so that you will understand
your rights before you talk to the judge today.

The judge today

will tell you about the misdemeanors or infractions that you are
charged with committing. The judge will ask you to enter a plea of
guilty, not guilty or no contest.

I will now explain what each of

these pleas means.
A plea of no contest means that you are not going to fight or
challenge the charges that are brought against you.

A no contest

plea carries the same penalties as a guilty plea, but it means that
you are not admitting that you are guilty.

If you enter a plea of

no contest, the judge may still sentence you to pay a fine, serve
a jail term, perform community service work, pay restitution to a
victim, or be on probation.
A

plea

of

not guilty

means

that

you are

challenging the charges brought against you.

fighting

or

If you plead not

guilty, the judge will order that you come back another day for a
trial or for a pretrial settlement conference.
If you plead guilty, you are admitting that the charges
against you are true.

If you plead guilty, the judge will make a

decision about whether to order that you pay a fine, serve a jail
term, perform some community service work, pay restitution to a
victim, or be placed on probation.

If you enter a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, you can
ask the judge to sentence you today.

However, you have the right

to come back and be sentenced between two and thirty days from
today's date.

Before the judge decides on your sentence, you may

speak to the judge and make an explanation and tell the judge
anything that you want the judge to know about you or your
circumstances.
If you plead guilty or no contest, you will not have a trial
and you will be giving up or waiving certain rights. These rights
are:
The right to have a speedy public trial;
The right to have a jury of persons who live in this
county hear your case and decide if you are guilty or not
guilty;
Also, the right to ask the judge to hear your case
without a jury and decide if you are guilty or not
guilty;
The right to testify at your own trial, and you may tell
the judge or jury about your case at your trial;
The right to remain silent at your own trial. No one can
make you testify at your own trial if you don't want to
testify, and no inference either of guilt or innocence
can be made because of your decision not to testify;
The right to be proven guilty of each charge beyond a
reasonable doubt. The prosecutor must prove that you are
guilty and must convince the judge or the jury that
here's your case, that you are guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the prosecutor fails to convince the judge or
the jury of your guilt, then you will be found not
guilty;
The right to confront and cross-examine in open court all
of the witnesses which the prosecution calls to testify
against you;
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The right to have your witnesses subpoenaed, at the
prosecution's expense, to come to your trial and testify
about your case. Even if the witnesses do not want to
testify, the judge can order them to come to the trial
and testify;
The right to appeal the decisions of the judge or the
jury;
Also, the right to hire your own lawyer to represent you.
If you will be hiring your own lawyer, please tell the
judge today. If you want to have a lawyer represent you
and if you do not have the money to hire one, you can ask
the judge to appoint a public defender. You will need to
tell the judge about your financial situation, and the
judge will decide if you qualify for a public defender.
If you plead guilty or no contest and later wish to withdraw
your plea, you must file a motion to withdraw your plea in court
within thirty days.
Your decision to plead guilty, not guilty or no contest is
your own personal decision.
make.

It is a decision that only you should

You should not plead guilty or no contest if you are now

under the influence of alcohol or drugs. You should also not plead
guilty if anyone has made any threats against you or has promised
you anything in return for your pleas of guilty or no contest.
I will now tell you about the different classifications of
crimes and the potential punishments associated with each.
If you are charged with a class A misdemeanor, the judge could
order you to pay a fine of up to $4,625 and also to serve a jail
term of up to one year.

If you are charged with a class B

misdemeanor, the judge could order you to pay a fine of up to
$1,850 and also to serve a jail term of up to 180 days.

If you are

charged with a class C misdemeanor, the judge could order you to
pay a fine of up to $1,387.50 and also to serve a jail term of up
3

to 90 days.

If you are charged with an infraction, the judge could

order you to pay a fine of up to $1,387.50.

The judge cannot

impose a jail term if you are charged with an infraction.
If you are charged with more than one crime, the judge can
impose consecutive sentences. That means that the judge may impose
separate jail sentences that do not run at the* same time.

The

judge may order that you serve one jail sentence for one crime, and
when that jail sentence is finished, you would begin to serve the
second jail sentence for the second crime and so forth.
Please also listen carefully to all of the orders that the
judge gives to you. If, for example, you are ordered to pay a fine
or complete community service by a certain date, be sure that you
do it, or a warrant for your arrest will be issued.

If you cannot

follow an order given by the judge, you should discuss the matter
with your lawyer or you should come back to the court and talk to
the judge about the problem. Often, extensions for time payment of
fines and completion of other court orders can be given by the
judge.
I have attempted to explain your rights as clearly as I can.
Your rights are important, and it is important that you understand
them.

If you do not understand them, you may ask the judge about

them or you may ask the judge to let you talk to your own lawyer or
with a public defender.
This will end the tape of the judge's statement of rights.
Thank you.
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But my understanding is, although he—Judge Ferrero
has done many hundred of these things, far more than District
Court Judges do, they do them all day and it's hard to
remember any one particular person, he does remember Mr.
Lucero.
THE COURT: So, he does have a specific
recollection?
MR. DANIELS: Well, let me just say, he has a vague
specific recollection.
THE COURT: Very well.
MR. DANIELS: He can't testify, I don't think, and
tell you, I remember telling Mr. Lucero X, Y and Z.

He'll

say, I remember Mr. Lucero. And here's what I did with him
because this is what I always do.

He can testify about his

usual procedure.
And generally, it's this:

He has them sign the

waiver and then he says to them, now that you've signed these
things and waived your rights, I need to satisfy my mind that
you're doing this freely and voluntarily and you understand
the consequences of it and he goes through those things one by
one.

And of course, that is in the file.
He goes through the elements of the offense.

goes through the possible sentences.

He

He tells them that—

about each of the rights they're waiving and in this case, in
particular, one of those rights as you can see, is the right

16

to be represented by counsel.
Now, there's some—in the petition, there is
memorandum, she makes—she says it's a little unclear as to
whether he really has a right or whether he doesn't.

I asked

Judge Ferrero about that and he says, well, in fact, it—the
way it's stated is exactly correct.

That is to say, if a—if-

-you're not always afforded an attorney because you can't
afford one.

I mean, many of us, if we were charged with a

serious crime probably couldn't afford an attorney.
THE COURT:
matter.

Indigency is not an issue in this

It's right to counsel, and whether or not he

exercised that right, whether it was afforded or not, either
indigent or not indigent.

To me, indigency is not the central

issue the Shelton case.
MR. DANIELS:

And I agree with that.

I—I think that Judge Ferrero would testify that he
goes through that with him, he helps him understand that he
does have a right to an attorney, that if he can't afford one,
one will be appointed.

That's in addition to what he's

already seen on the—on the videotape.
And then when he is through asking him all those
questions, if he's satisfied that it's free—done freely and
voluntarily and knowingly and that he's not under the
influence of substances or whatever, then he signs the thing
and that his signature is certification of that.

17

That would

be his testimony if he were called as a witness.
THE COURT:

All right.

Ms. Brereton, do you have any differing opinions as
to burden of going forward, vis-a-vis burden of proof in this
matter?
MS. BRERETON:

I do think that by bringing that

petition, that we have satisfied the burden that we have, that
we make—we've alleged, or Mr. Lucero's alleged that he did
not understand and that he was sentenced to jail and was not
given an attorney.
THE COURT:

But in all—in all respects to this Mr.

Daniels, this was not a verified petition, was it?
MS. BRERETON:
THE COURT:

It was not.

All right. And so I think there has to

be something on the record—
MS. BRERETON:
THE COURT:

—unless you want to just proffer it.

MS. BRERETON:
THE COURT:

The other—

Well, I would proffer—

Yeah.

MS. BRERETON:

—that defendant did not understand

and we would make that proffer.

I think there's also evidence

to that in the docket that we have before us and in the record
because Mr. Lucero, in this case, did on two occasions ask
that the matter be continued at pre-trial conference, so that
he could speak with an attorney.

18

There's nothing to indicate
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"EXHIBIT THREE
BRIAN E. BROWER, UBN 8486
MURRAY CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
5025 S. STATE ST.
P.O. BOX 57520
MURRAY, UTAH 84157-0520
TELEPHONE: (801) 264-2642

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
BENJAMIN FRANK LUCERO,
Petitioner/Defendant
vs.
SHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD; CHIEF
PAUL CUNNINGHAM; SALT LAKE
COUNTY JAIL; MURRAY CITY
JUSTICE COURT,

AFFIDAVIT OF MS. KAYLYNN
OLSEN SUPPORTING MURRAY
CITY'S MOTION TO DISMISS
PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Civil Case No. 020907208
Judge: GLENN K. IWASAKI

Respondents/Plaintiff.

At all times herein mentioned, the affiant, Ms. Kaylynn Olsen, avers the following:
1.

I am one of the two in-court clerks assigned to handle pre-trial and trial calendars

in the Murray City Municipal Justice Court for Judge P. Gary Ferrero.
2.

That prior to accepting any guilty plea, Judge Ferrero orally advises each

defendant of theirrights,including their right to be represented by an attorney.
3.

That I was the in-court clerk for each of Mr. Benjamin Lucero's pre-trial

conferences on case number 015003617 in the Murray Municipal Justice Court.
4.

That based on my review of the minute entries made by myself during Mr.

Lucero's pre-trial conferences, the case was continued on at least two separate occasions
at the defendant's request so that he could retain an attorney.

5.

That based on my review of the minute entry made by myself at Mr. Lucero's

hearing on April 29, 2002, as well as my experience observing Judge Ferrero accepting
thousands of guilty pleas, it is my convincing belief that prior to accepting Mr. Lucero's
guilty plea, Judge Ferrero orally informed Mr. Lucero of his constitutional rights,
including his right to be represented by an attorney and that if he could not afford to hire
his own attorney, that one could be appointed for him free of charge if he qualified based
on his income.
6.

That based on my review of the minute entry made by myself as well as the

Justice Court's case file on the aforementioned matter, that Mr. Lucero executed a written
rights waiver informing him of hisrightto counsel and expressing his desire to waive that
right.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s e l l day of

IJUULfo

O T Q ^ •

QvK/nn f n c p n y Affiant
Affiant
Ms. If
Kaylyn^Olsen?
Murray City Justice Court Clerk

STATE OF UTAH

)

:ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 7 $
day of^flft'tfT _ 2002, Ms. Kaylynn Olsen appeared before me, signer
foregoing
document,
who duly ackno
of the foregoii
acknowledged to me that^he executed the same.
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IN THE MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT IN AND FOR THE CITY OF MURRAY,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

CITY OF MURRAY
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
RIGHTS WAIVER

vs.

_L<^C g , r gJ

^ Defendant

Judge: P. Gary Ferrero

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA
DECLARACIO'N DEL ACUSADO QUE SE DECLARA CULPABLE

NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES
NOTIFICACIO'N DE LAS ACUSACIONES

I have received and read or had read to me a copy of the information which states the crime(s) with which I
am charged. I understand the charges against me. I have no questions about what I am accused of having done.
He recibido y he leido o se me ha le'ido una copia del informe el cual describe el(los) delito(s) del(de
los) cual(es) se me acusa. Entiendo el(los) cargo(s) en mi contra y no tengo pregunta alguna al respecto de lo
que se me acusa de haber hecho.
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
RENUNCIA DE LOS DERECHOS CONSTITUCIONALES
Under the constitution of Utah and of the United States I have the following right:
Bajo la constitution del Estado de Utah y de los Estados Unidos, tengo los siguientes derechos:

1)
COUNSEL:. I have the right to consult with and be represented by an attorney. If the
judge were to determine that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint
one to represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay for the
appointed lawyer's service to me.
1)
ABOGADO: Tengo el derecho de consultar con un abogado y que e'ste me represente.
Si el juez determinara que no tengo los fondos para contratar un abogado, el juez puede asignar
uno para que me represente. Puede ser que despue's, si el juez determinara que tenia o tengo las
posibidades de contratar un abogado, se me requiera pagar por los servicios legales que se me
proporcionaron.
2)
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Although I can choose to testify if I wish,
I cannot be forced by anyone to take the witness stand and testify or give evidence against myself. That
I choose not to testify cannot be held against me in court.
2)
PRIVILEGIO EN CONTRA DEL LA AUTOINCRIMINACION: Aunque puedo escoger
testificar si lo deseo, nadie me puede forzar a pasar al estrado de los testigos y testificar o dar
evidencia en mi contra. Mi decision de no testificar, no se puede utilizar en mi contra durante el
juicio.

3)

CONFRONTATION AND CROSS EXAMINATION OF ACCUSERS: I have a right to see

and hear in open court the witnesses who give evidence against me. I have, if I represent myself or
my attorney has, in my behalf, therightto ask questions of those witnesses. I also have the nght to have
witnesses who will testify in my behalf subpoenaed or, in other words, called to court at government
expenses.
3)
CONFRONTACIO'N Y CONTRAINTERROGACIO'N DE LOS ACUSADORES: Tengo
el derecho de ver y de escuchar a ios testigos que presen pruebas en mi contra en una audiencia
pu'blica. Tengo, si me representara a mi' mismo o si lo hiciera mi abogado, el derecho
de interrogar a esos testigos. Tambi'en tengo el derecho de que se emplacen a ios testigos para que
testifiquen a mi favor, o en otras palabras, que se llamen al tribunal a cuenta del gobierno estatal.
4)
JURY TRIAL: I can choose to have a jury hear the case against me. .Any verdict rendered by a
jury, whether it be guilty or not guilty must be by complete agreement of all jurors.
4)
JUICIO ANTE UN JURADO: Puedo escoger que un jurado escuche el caso en mi contra.
Cualquiera que sea el veredicto que el jurado dicte, ya sea de culpable o no culpable, tendra' que ser
por medio de un acuerdo una'nime de todos Ios miembros del jurado.
5)
PRESUMPTION AND PROOF: At trial I am presumed innocent until proven guilty. The burden
of proving me guilty of the crime(s) charged is upon the prosecutor who must prove each and every
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
5)
PRESUNCION Y PRUEBA: En el juicio, se me considera inocente hasta que se
compruebe mi culpabilidad. El peso de probar mi culpabilidad por el(los) delito(s) que se me
acusa(n) cae sobre el fiscal, el cual debe probar mas alia' de una duda razonable cada uno y todos
Ios elementos del(se Ios) delito(s).
6)
APPEAL: If I were to be tried and convicted of the crime(s) with which I am charged. I could
appeal from any errors of law that may have resulted in my conviction.
6)
A L P E L A C I O ' N : Si se me enjuiciara y condenara por el(los) delito(s) del(de Ios) cual(es) se
me acusa(n), podr'ia apelar debido a cualquier error de derecho que haya resultado en mi condena.
I understand each of these constitutional rights. They have been explained to me by the judge or a lawyer.
I have no question about them. I know that I could plead not guilty and exercise all of the rights listed above. I
understand that by entering a plea of guilty. I AM GIVING UP THESE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
Entiendo cada uno de estos derechos constitucionales. El juez o el abogado me Ios ha explicado y no
tengo pregunta alguna al respecto. Se' que puedo declararme no culpable y ejercer todos Ios derechos
mencionados previamente. Entiendo que al declararme culpable, ESTOY RENUNCIANDO A ESTOS
DERECHOS CONSTITUCIONALES.
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA
CONSECUENCIAS DE UNA DELARACION DE CULPABILIDAD
I am admitting that I did commit the crime(s) to which I plead guilty. I convict myself the same as if I
were found guilty by a judge or jury. Where more that one crime is mvolved, sentences my be imposed one after
another, consecutively, or may run at the same time, concurrently. In sentencing me the judge is not required to
follow what any other person recommends. The judge must impose sentence within the following limits:
Estoy admitiendo que cometf el(los) delito(s) al(a Ios) cual(es) me estoy declarando culpable. Me
condeno de la misma manera como si un juez o un jurado me hubiera encontrado culpable. Si existiera ma's
de un delito, las sentencias se podri'an imponer una seguida de la otra (consecutivamente); o se podri'an
servir al mismo tiempo (simulta'neamente). No se requiere que el juez siga la recomeudacio'n de otras
personas en el di'a que se dicte mi pena. El juez debe dictar la pena dentro de ios siguientes if mites:

JAIL
CARCEL

FINE
MULTA

Class B Misdemeanor
Class C Misdemeanor
Infraction

0-180 days
0- 90 days
0 days

$0-51,850.00
$0-$ 750.00
$0-$ 750.00

Delito Menor Clase B
Delito Menor Clase C
Infraccion

0-180 dias
0-90 dias
0 dias

$0-$1,850.00
$0-$ 750.00
$0-$ 750.00

OFFENSE
DELITO

Certain crimes require added fees or other conditions of sentencing. Some penalties for certain crimes may
be made greater or enhanced, if there are other convictions for similar crimes. I understand these consequences and
have no questions about them.
Ciertos delitos requieren que se les a~nadan multas u otras condiciones a la pena. Algunas penas
por ciertos delitos, si hubiesen otras condenas por delitos similares, pueden ser mayores o se pueden
aumentar. Entiendo estas consecuencias y no tengo pregunta alguna al respecto.

ENTRY OR GUILTY PLEA
DECLARACIO'N DE CULPABILIDAD
Of my own choice I enter this plea. No force, promises or threats have been made to get me to do it. I am
not under the influence of alcohol or drugs or anything that would impair my judgement right now. I have read this
document or had it read to me. I understand is contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. By signing this
document I am saying that I ENTER A PLEA OF
Hago esta declaration por decisio'n propia. No se me ha obligado, prometido, ni amenazado para
que lo haga. No estoy bajo la influencia del alcohol, drogas o nada que pueda afectar mi sano juicio en este
momento. He lei do o se me ha lei do este documento. Entiendo el contenido de dicho documento y adopto
cada declaracio'n como propia. Al firmar este documento, estoy diciendo que ME DECLARO

GUILTY to:
CULPABLE DE:

DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL/DRUGS, MB
Names of crime(s) and Class of crime(s)
Nombre de(de los) delito(s) y Clase del(de los) delito(s)

Statement of specific comprising elements of each offense and special terms if applicable (plea negotiation,
no contest plea, etc.):
Declaracio'n de los elementos especi'ficos por cada delito y arregos especiales si se aplican
(negociaciones, declaracio'n de no disputar, etc.):
1.

OPERATE OR ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A MOTOR VEHICLE

2.

UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS

3-

IMPAIRED (.08 OR HIGHER BLOOD ALCOHOL) OR INCAPABLE OF SAFELY
OPERATING THE VEHICLE

I further understand that if I am in this country illegally, I am subject to deportation by the Department of
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Further that if I am an Alien with Legal Resident status my status may be
revoked and I could be subject to deportation
Adema's entiendo que si estoy ilegalmente en este pais, estoy sujeto a ser deportado por el
Departamento de Servicios de Inmigracio'n y Naturalizacio'n. Ademas si soy un extranjero con un estado de
Residencia Legal, mi estado puede ser revocado y puedo estar suejeto a deportacio'n.
I further understand that if convicted and deported and I re-enter illegally I am. subject to prosecution in die
federal courts for illegal re-entry if the conviction was a misdemeanor. If the convictian was for felony or a Class A
misdemeanor it can be aggravated re-entry.
Ademas entiendo que si soy condenado por un delito menor y deportado y regreso ilegalmente estoy
sujeto a ser procesado en los tribunales federales por regresar ilegalmente. Si la condena fue por un delito
mayor o un delito menor Clase A. Puedo ser enjuiciado por regresar con agravantes
I UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW THIS PLEA WITHIN 30 DAYS OF
TODAY'S DATE AS LONG AS THE REQUEST IS IN WRITING AND FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN.
ENTIENDO QUE TENGO EL DERECHO DE RETIRAR ESTA DECLARACION DENTRO DE
UN PLAZO EL DE 30 DIAS DESDE EL DIA DE HOY, CON TAL DE QUE LA PETICION SEA HECHA
POR ESCRITO Y POR UNA BUENA RAZON.

Date
Fecha

'j^/o £
Defendant's Sign^Qre
Firma del Acusado

Defendant's Attorney
Abogado Defe

Hon. P.
Judge, Murray Municipal Justice Court
Juez
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Heather Brereton (8151)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
Attorneys for Petitioner
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

AUG 8 - 2002

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Benjamin Frank Lucero,
Petitioner,
AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY
vs.
Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard;
Chief Paul Cunningham; Salt
Lake County Jail; Murray City
Justice Court,
Respondents.

Case No. Q^Q^O
1 0^°$
Judge: J i n x ? <?a JU

STATE OF UTAH
:ss
COUNTY OF

)

I, Benjamin Frank Lucero, do solemnly swear that owing to my poverty I am
unable to bear the expenses of the action or legal proceedings which I am about to
commence (or the appeal which I am about to take), and that I verily believe I am justly
entitled to the relief sought by such action, legal proceedings or appeal.
(a)
(b)
(c)

I, Benjamin Frank Lucero, am a resident of S L C o and incarcerated at
the Salt Lake County Jail, Salt Lake City, Utah.
My amount of income, including government financial support, alimony,
child support is $ O per month.
Assets owned, including real and personal property

(e)

Accounts receivable:

(f)

Securities, checking and savings account
balances:
<2>

(g)

Debts:

(h)

Monthly

£

^ * ^ ;I

3 r<9d) * ~

'Zoo*'*

expenses:

DATED this ~^ (

<* « ,A 5

day of

Q o (y

2002.

AND SWORN TO before me this*3{ day of
&^%\
£\<^y*J
V°«r$ /i/

Patricia A. Rodman

Kx\flM.\0U. \ .

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

84,
5'y LCommission
rKe C"y' U,ahExpires
°2

s

STATE OF j)TAH

I

%\)\\v
§*%

A-SQtxPTM

2002

Heather Brereton (8151)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
Attorneys for Plaintiff
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

m

£H9.0mmi

COURT

Third Judicial District

AUG 3 - 2002
//'

/SALT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
Benjamin Frank Lucero,
Petitioner,
APPLICATION TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS, SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTATION AND ORDER

vs.
Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard;
Chief Paul Cunningham: Salt Lake
County Jail; Murray City Justice
Court,
Respondents.

Case No. O^OJO

Judge:

7^?

JT^ASS£/

I, Benjamin Frank Lucero, declare according to Utah Code Ann. § 21-7-3 that I am the plaintiff in the aboveentitled proceeding; that, in support of my request to proceed without being required to prepay fees, cost or give
security therefor, I state that because of my poverty, I am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or give security
therefor; that I believe I am entitled to relief. The nature of my action is briefly stated as follows: That I am
entitled to relief under Rule 65C since the conviction or sentence in my criminal case was imposed in violation
of the state and federal constitutions.
As required by state law, I hereby answer the following questions:
I. Are you presently employed? (If an inmate, are you employed in an inmate program or work release
program)
Yes •
No
a. If the answer is "yes", state the amount of your salary or wages per month, and give the name
and address of your employer (list both gross and net salary):

b. If the answer is "no", state the date of last employment and the amount of the salary and wages
per month which you received:
/K
$ 2 - 30 O f*±<r i\o^ +

H L
2. Are you representing yourself in this lawsuit?

T?.fr...?

Yes Q-""

No •

3. Have you received within the past twelve months any money from any of the following sources?
.
a. Business, profession or other form of self-employment?
Yes •
No ^^y/
b. Rent payments, interest or dividends?
Yes n
No 0 ^ \
c. Pension, annuities or life insurance payments?
Yes •
NoJ*

d. Gifts or inheritance?,

No 0 / /

Yes •

If the answer to any of the above is "yes," describe each source of money and state the amount received
from each during the past twelve months:
4. Do you own any cash, or do you have money in checking or savings account? (Include any funds in
prison accounts.)
Yes a
NOG
If the answer is "yes", state current balance

$

5. Do you own or have any interest in any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes^aiUornobiles>or other
property of value?
Yes Q^~~ No •
If the answer is "yes," describe the property, specify its location, and state its approximate value:

6. List persons who are dependent upon you for financial support, state your relationship to those persons,
and indicate how much you contribute toward their support:

7. Are you receiving alimony?
If "yes", how much per month?

Yes •
$

No 0^

8. Annual untaxed income and benefits:
a. Social security benefits
$ _ _ 0
b. Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC or ADC)
$
0
c. Child Support
$
(2>
d. Welfare Benefits
$
®
e. Worker's Compensation
$
0
f. Veterans noneducational benefits such as Death Pension, Dependency, and Indemnity
Compensation
$
$
g. Housing, food, and other living allowances paid to members of the military, clergy, and
others
$
0
Total

$

9. Are you receiving funds or money from any other sources?

Yes •

if the answer is "yes", please list:

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information is true and correct
Executed on

*7/S/(&2r
(date)

r—-/Signature

,,';-;;'..^

.WJAWY PUBLIC

A .i^'X \

P?tr:cte A. Rodman

I '- / '&*• :'' X{ \
\M (, ^ . j '•/
I \LK'* J ^ / v

" J 4 C d S t 5 0 r ) South #300
Sa.t Lake City, Utah 84102
My
Commission Expires

(siaf^V™^
v
eari^^^-y
i
—^

June 2 2005

June?
STATE
OF-xsn*
UTAH

of Appflicaot)

Notary Public
My Commission Expires:

$
No

